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The international community intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to put an end to the devastating 
conflict. Since then the Kosovar population has lived under the United Nations’ administration, 
went through a partially recognized independence process in 2008, and experienced violent 
episodes between the different local communities but also with the international interveners. 
Nowadays, Kosovo is struggling with a complicated state building and slow economic 
development while international organizations are still present in the field. This case study 
examines the tensions between local and global actors during the peacebuilding missions in 
Kosovo. It seeks to discover how those tensions and their consequences are understood by local 
grassroots subjects and international peacebuilders. Through protests and local resistance, the 
Kosovar population showed its discontent towards the international interveners’ measures and 
actions. The goal of this study is to give a voice to local grassroots actors, who seem left out of 
the liberal Western organizations’ agendas.    
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Presentation of the problem 
 
In March 1999, former US President Bill Clinton declared on the international intervention in 
Kosovo: “We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that 
has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united 
with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, 
and advancing the cause of peace” (The New York Times, March 25th, 1999). This declaration 
illustrates the liberal interventionism of the Western world and draws the premises of another 
conflict between local and global actors. The reasons behind the international intervention 
cannot, however, be solely reduced to the urge to make peace in the region, there are other 
interests that underline the willingness to intervene (De Coning, 2013). 
The study is about giving a voice to the local grassroots subjects on the tensions between 
local and global actors during peacebuilding processes. The different visions of peace, as well 
as the expectations of peacebuilding missions of the local and global actors in the field, will be 
at the center of this research. 
The first intervention occurred in March 1999 with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) air operations. It led to the signature of an agreement, the “Kumanovo 
Treaty”, with Yugoslav and Serb forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an 
international presence, which marked the end of the war on the 9th of June 1999. The day after, 
the Security Council of the United Nations signed the 1244 resolution1, therefore created the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and provided a mandate to intervene in and 
administrate the territory and is still active today. On the 17th of February 2008, the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (UDI) was self-proclaimed by the authorities in 
Pristina. 2008 has been an important year for Kosovo, as the European Union launched its rule 
of law and justice support, the EULEX mission. It is based on a renewable two years mandate 
from the United Nations, as the European Union could not agree on a common foreign policy 
regarding the Kosovo case. The peacebuilding mission in Kosovo for the international 
 




interveners entailed, according to the 1244 resolution, to perform basic civilian administrative 
functions; support the reconstruction of key infrastructures; maintain civil law and order; 
promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a 
political process to determine Kosovo's future status - to mention a few. 
What is interesting from a research point of view, is to learn more about the tensions that 
arose from the interplay between local and global actors and how they are understood by the 
local grassroots subjects and the international interveners in the field. The relation between 
local and global actors aroused the interest of the researchers to understand the outcomes of 
peacebuilding and their implications. In the model proposed by Barnett and Zürcher (2009), 
while they claim that international interveners are quite successful in putting an end to the 
violent conflict, they also demonstrate that the peacebuilding operations have a mixed record 
of success. Their inputs are useful to understand the interplay between local and global actors 
and therefore led me to the reflection on the tensions during peacebuilding processes.  
The problem of tensions emerging from the interplay between local and global actors in 
peacebuilding is due to the various existing dimensions highly complex. The United Nations 
(UN), NATO and the European Union (EU) as a third party, to which I will also refer to as 
“Western organizations” throughout the thesis, played an important role in the peacebuilding 
and state-building processes in Kosovo since 1998. The different missions under which they 
are still operating today are challenged. The lack of inclusion of the local civil society in the 
peacebuilding process in Kosovo, a concept called “local ownership”, is discussed and 
criticized. It is a necessary measure to increase peacebuilding effectiveness (Leonardsson & 
Rudd, 2015), as well as to consolidate a more sustainable and resilient peace (Aggestam & 
Strömbom, 2013). The gradual transfer of externally held power to local representatives seems 
essential to legitimate the missions and the new local institutions (Narten, 2008). The 
international organizations and their strategies are an illustration of the liberal peacebuilding, 
which gather the efforts of powerful Western nations and the United Nations to bring peace in 
war-torn societies. The peacebuilders have the goal to achieve liberal peace, which includes 
liberal transformation, where they need the cooperation of state and secondary elites if they are 
to maintain stability and implement their liberalizing programs (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). The 
implementation of liberal values such as democracy, rule of law, and economic liberalism 




Also, in Kosovo, it has been a long process: The international interveners came into a devastated 
and completely destroyed society. UNMIK, through the United Nations mandate, established 
new institutions, built from the ground, they gave the Kosovar population a new currency 
(Deutsche Mark at the time), they rebuilt cities and trained people to work for the different 
institutions. The multi-ethnic environment, the deeply divided society and the trauma from the 
recent war did not facilitate the work of the international interveners. Peacebuilders tend to push 
for instant liberalization, however, states emerging from war often do not have the necessary 
institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with 
political and market competition (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009).  
Another point that is vital in order to understand the problem is the time frame, in which 
the missions were conducted. It is highly topical to study because, in Kosovo, the peacebuilding 
missions are particularly long, which can develop issues over time. Especially now, it is 
important to understand, since the mandate of UNMIK from the 1244 resolution, which does 
not have an end date, has not changed, nor evolved over the last two decades. With an 
international presence of over twenty years, the contacts with certain actors and not with others 
as well as the lack of knowledge about the locals and their culture can cause problems. Since 
2000, the tensions between the diverse actors in the field are palpable. Protests against the 
international presence broke across Kosovo, coming from either the Serb or Albanian 
community. Tensions were more or less visible and violent, and the perception of the 
international organizations by the different communities evolved over the years, as we will see 
in the thesis.  
Aims, objectives and research questions 
 
The study aims to examine the tensions between local and global actors during peacebuilding 
processes by analyzing how locals and international interveners describe and understand these 
tensions.  
The term tension is a broad, purposely chosen as it can include physical and violent altercations, 
anger, and frustration as well as resistance and indirect confrontation. From the dictionary 
definition 2, tensions, in a sense of social tensions, are: “the feeling caused by a lack of trust 
 




between people, groups, or countries who do not agree about something and may attack each 
other”. It is also defined as “a situation in which opposing aims, ideas, or influences cause 
problems”. In the case of Kosovo and the framework of this study, three dimensions of tensions 
between local and global actors in peacebuilding are relevant. First, to analyze the conflictual 
visions of peace of the different actors in the field, then to understand the causes of those 
tensions according to the participants. Finally, the last dimension requires examining the 
consequences of the tensions and the peacebuilding missions on the peace, the local population, 
and the development of Kosovo. 
As stated above, the interplay between local and global interveners generally seems to generate 
tensions, potentially because international organizations and peacebuilders are mainly 
following their own interests and locals feel neglected by the international community. 
Therefore, it is highly necessary to understand the different perspectives on these tensions and 
their consequences on the peacebuilding and state-building process. 
The focus of the study is consequently the perspectives of grassroots subjects from different 
communities as well as insights from international peacebuilders in order to answer the 
following overarching research question:  
“In what way do grassroots and external intervening subjects understand the tensions 
between local and global actors and their consequences for peacebuilding and state-building 
in Kosovo?” 
From the perspective of the grassroots subjects and external actors, the aim is to understand and 
get relevant insights on those tensions, as well as to give them a chance to share their views and 
opinions on the tensions between local actors and international interveners. 
In order to delimit the overarching research question further, and guide my research, I have 
formulated three specified sub-research-questions, addressing the main objectives of the study.  
“By sharing their visions of peace and their priorities in peacebuilding, how are depicted the 
tensions dividing local and global actors by the participants?” 
The first objective of the study is to discover what type of tensions spread across Kosovo after 
the war in 1999, and how different form of tensions are still present today, after the unilateral 




silence, the aim of this study is the leave space for the different actors to express their visions 
of peace and opinions on the tensions generated by the peacebuilding missions. 
Then, the second objective is to identify “how the causes of those tensions are described and 
perceived by the different actors interviewed in the field?”. 
This second sub-research-question is focusing on the “root causes” of the tensions, as described 
by the empirical sources, which can be ambiguous and sometimes unclear. Precisely, to 
understand how the situation in Kosovo degenerated in the context of -chronologically- 
bringing peace to the region and building a sustainable state.  
 And finally, to figure out “what are the perspectives of the local and global actors on the 
consequences of the missions and the tensions they arose?”.  
Throughout the thesis and the empirical study, the goal is also to get a deeper understanding of 
the consequences and implications that the missions and tensions have on peacebuilding and 
on the development in Kosovo, according to the subjects interviewed in the field.  
Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized into five parts. After the introduction, this paper continues as follows. 
First, the previous research section, which gives an overview of the literature relevant for this 
study. The second part elaborates on the theoretical framework. The third part includes the 
methodology, explaining the choices regarding the method and the case study approach. Then 
in the fourth part is the presentation of the empirical data. This part is split into two sections, 
first describing the empirical findings and in a second section discussing those results. Finally, 
the last part concludes the thesis and answers the research question as well as gives the 






This section will present concepts from previous research on peacebuilding and on the 
difficulties local and global actors encountered while implementing peace.  
First, a conceptual clarification is necessary. In peacebuilding processes, the previous literature 
distinguishes three key actors: peacebuilders, who want stability and liberalization; the 
government of the targeted country, who wants to maintain its power; and secondary elites, 
who have veto power over any changes that they believe are a threat to their economic and 
political positions (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). In my research on the interplay and the tensions 
between local and global actors, I am using their distinction of the different actors and I am 
adding another group of actors, the local grassroots subjects. I differentiate the local political 
elite and the local government officials from global actors, which include all third-party and 
international interveners, working for international organizations at different levels. 
Throughout the thesis, international “officials”, working in Brussels or New York will be 
distinguished from “peacebuilders” or “interveners” in the field, who, even though they work 
for the same organization and pursue a common goal, are confronted with a completely different 
reality. My contribution will be based on the inclusion of the point of view of local grassroots 
subjects on the problem, in other words, the “indigenous” or “local population”, alongside the 
insights derived from peacebuilders.  
According to the majority of the literature from the last two decades, emphasizing the role of 
the locals in the effectiveness of contemporary peacebuilding, the voices of the locals are more 
important than they have been considered by international organizations. Scholars are more and 
more advising bottom-up processes based on dialogue and inclusivity (Baù, 2016; Leonardsson 
& Rudd, 2015). Indeed, top-down processes have been criticized in the literature of 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Mac Ginty, 2008; Campbell, 2011; Donais, 2013; 
Richmond, 2014). A bottom-up peace process seems to be a good start in conflict-affected 
areas, especially in deeply divided societies (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2003; De Coning, 
2013). Peacebuilding from below includes the idea that in order to reach an effective and 
sustainable peacemaking process, the latter must be based on the empowerment of war-torn 
communities. It is important to recognize the significance of local actors and of the non-




al., chapter 9, 2011). This is a crucial argument since international peacebuilders need to change 
their language, goals, and approach to be relevant for the local population’s needs and the 
people living with them. Consequently, the issue is often not whether the international 
interveners reached their goals of peacebuilding (Wallis, 2017). Regarding international 
interveners, they are bound to the neutrality principles, which is a challenge as well. In 
peacebuilding “neutrality” has been reinterpreted as “impartial support” for peace or 
reconstruction processes, but in intense conflict zones no intervener will be seen as impartial 
(Ramsbotham et al. chapter 8, 2011). However, even if scholars are aware that internal actors 
are almost always the most important aspect of peacebuilding interventions, they cannot ignore 
the fact that devastation is often so great and the civil population’s need for support is so 
pressing that external support for reconstruction is often badly needed. They also mentioned 
that devastated territories and the urge for reconstruction may not always be the primary reason 
for outsiders to intervene (Ramsbotham et al. chapter 8, 2011). 
A bottom-up process could be a real asset for the construction and practice of everyday peace. 
Especially, where more traditional and formal approaches of peacebuilding have failed, it can 
be an important part of the process. Everyday peace is constituted of daily social practices 
within the war-torn and post-conflict societies (Mac Ginty, 2014). The notion of these local and 
global encounters and friction do not only happen horizontally (within or between structures) 
but they do also happen vertically. And in the case of the Kosovo peace-building process, 
imposed norms usually fail to resonate with local actors (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015). Björkdahl 
& Gusic acknowledged that the recipients of norms implemented by global actors are frequently 
ignored in the literature, however, their focus is on local actors and agencies. The research gap 
I am trying to fill through this study is of course including these local actors but also less heard 
and less powerful local individuals, i.e. the grassroots, that are often on the front lines of the 
tensions with international interveners.  
However, it is important to mention that the “local” is not a simple and unique notion, it is a 
complex and constantly evolving notion, where the one-size-fits-all approaches cannot work 
(Hirblinger & Simons, 2015). Regarding the notion of local turn, MacGinty & Richmond 
(2013) wrote an article that encourages a reassessment of some of the parameters that have been 
used to understand and justify international interventions. They warn the reader on the binary 




local turn is messy and a cacophony of thinking. However, it has the capacity to be vibrant and 
relevant to the communities from which it emerges. The concept of hybrid peace is relevant to 
this study, as it implies the active participation of external and local actors in peacebuilding 
processes. Peace becomes hybrid when local actors may be capable of autonomous action 
towards liberal peace interventions, whether it is in adapting it, subvert it, resist it or even ignore 
it (Mac Ginty, 2010). 
These notions lead to the concept of local ownership. The latter implies the participation and 
inclusion of the local (civil society and politicians) in the peacebuilding and state-building 
process, because initiatives that are not driven by domestic actors are unlikely to reflect local 
needs or dynamics, to be implemented properly, or to be sustained (Nathan, 2007). Narten 
(2008) argues that the later significant local ownership is achieved, and external authority 
transferred to local representatives, the more local actors tend to challenge the legitimacy of the 
peace-building agenda and engage in confrontation with international actors. Donais (2009) 
examines the questions of local ownership as well. In post-conflict peacebuilding he suggests 
that the search for ways to operationalize local ownership principles remains one of the key 
challenges of contemporary peacebuilding. He also outlines a vision of peacebuilding as a 
cultural exchange as a way forward. On the other hand, Paffenholz (2015) warns scholars and 
future researchers on the mistakes peacebuilding scholars can easily make, such as the 
ignorance of local elites, providing a romanticized interpretation of hybrid peace, and 
overstating local resistance. Indeed, scholars are warning about the pitfalls of alternatives and 
“hybrid” peace, as they can reproduce the liberal peace’s logic of inclusion and exclusion 
(Nadarajah et al., 2015). 
Another debate on liberal peace and the international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) that is 
relevant to the research question is the accountability of international organizations. The United 
Nations, intervening in Kosovo under the UNMIK mission created by the 1244 resolution 
(1999) benefits from broad immunities. This principle exists since the creation of the UN and 
has been understood as necessary to achieve the United Nations’ purposes. However, 
immunities (of the organization and its employees) conflict with an individual’s right to a 
remedy and the law’s ordinary principle of responsibility for causing harm. This inherent 
conflict at the center of the immunity doctrine has evolved into a very public rift in the case of 




Organization is perceived by some to have trumped the dignity of affected individuals. One of 
the cases is the Kosovo Lead poisoning: The population affected by the poisoning in the camps 
near Mitrovica (Northern Kosovo) saw their claims classified as “not receivable” by the United 
Nations. Immunities serve in protecting the organization; however, it can have implications for 
the local population, which leads to questioning the accountability of international 
organizations in the literature. In an article written by Boon (2016), two proposals regarding 
the issue have been put forward: a reversion of the functional immunities initially envisioned 
for the United Nations (under Article 105 of the UN Charter, see Appendix 2) and the purchase 
by the United Nations of third-party insurance to be able to pay reparations to claim that arise 
(Boon, 2016). Overall scholars are calling for greater international organizations’ regime of 
accountability than it is the case at present (Wilde, 2006; Boon & Mégret, 2019). 
Contribution of this Study  
 
Overall, the research gap I am trying to close in this study is the lack of inclusion of the 
grassroots subjects’ voices in the peacebuilding literature. This study will also be centered on 
the gap between different visions of peace, while also focusing on the negative reactions, 
contestations and tensions after the intervention of the international community in the region. 
As the results of this study will emphasize, the tensions between local and global actors can be 
of different nature and dimensions. From the missions’ negative public opinion, frustration and 
local resistance to violent protests, the interviewees looked back on these events to share their 
experiences and opinions. 
Moreover, the research aim is also to contribute to the field of European Studies. This case 
study will highlight different issues, including the limits of the European diplomacy and 
security policies, through the previous literature and the results of the empirical study. 
Throughout the thesis, the different theories discussed will be tested and examined, with 






After having exposed why we should expect tensions between local and global actors based on 
previous research, this section will outline the theoretical framework through the three 
dimensions that are examined in the empirical study.  
Conflictual visions of peace 
 
The concept of the local is complex and involves a lot of actors with different visions of peace. 
According to Lederach’s pyramid (1997, see Appendix 1) and his approach to peacebuilding, 
he differentiates three types of actors, which are useful for my research. On top of the pyramid, 
there is the top-level elite leadership that comprises the key political, military, and religious 
leaders in the conflict. It is followed by the middle-range leadership, including e.g. leaders of 
mid-level NGOs, education, health, or agriculture, who are more numerous than the first ones. 
At the bottom of the pyramid are the grassroots leadership, in other words, the people involved 
in local communities and members of indigenous NGOs, which are representing the masses. 
This last category is the key cornerstone of my study.  
Regarding these global and local encounters, the term friction was introduced by Björkdahl & 
Höglund, and one of the conclusions they made and which is interesting for the case of Kosovo 
is that when the international peace-builders had entered into post-conflict societies with the 
promise of delivering peace, liberal democracy, good governance, rule of law and market 
economy, frictions may arise. This idea of frictions in global and local encounters relates to the 
tensions studied in this research, where tensions are defined as occurring when opposing views, 
ideologies, and aims trigger problems. Indeed, there has generally been limited space for local 
actors to construct a peace of their own making. This generated frictions and made this “new” 
hybrid peace challenging for both sides (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013). The concept of peace 
and precisely the concept of liberal peace is central to this study. The crisis of liberal peace has 
generated many debates among scholars. They are arguing that bureaucratic organizations face 
limitations in implementing contemporary peacebuilding, with a lack of flexibility regarding 
the liberal values and a lack of knowledge of the locals (Williams & Mengistu, 2015). 




heterotopias, multiple alternatives to conflict resolution, and peacebuilding and not one liberal 
strategy that is frequently repeated. “Liberal peace” is defined as a specific vision of peace that 
has come to be leading and that promotes democracy, human rights, free markets, and the rule 
of law as the solution for war-torn countries around the world. Critics have called for moderated 
and alternative policy models for what is seen as an imposed agenda, based on Western values 
and interests. Since liberal peace is essentially a preconceived set of strategies, it leaves little 
room for negotiations with local actors. Moreover, much of this criticism on liberal peace is in 
fact criticism of interventionist and top-down approaches, as mentioned in the previous section 
(Van Leeuwena et al., 2015; Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013).  
Another key concept for this dissertation is the local resistance. When local actors resist 
international peace-building efforts through one or many campaigns of resistance it is likely 
that it involves multiple actors with multiple motivations. One of the (many) forms of local 
resistance that is particularly important for the research question is the principle-oriented 
resistance that relates to situations where people resist peacebuilding because they believe the 
themes set by international actors are not compatible with their principles (Sung Yong Lee, 
2015). It is a particularly relevant concept to the case and the research questions, as it 
demonstrates a gap between the different visions and expectations of peace between local and 
global actors. The author also implies that one of the motivations of the principle-oriented 
resistance may be the non-compatibility of liberal principles with local ones. 
Moreover, researchers have looked at expectations of peace and gaps between local and global 
actors during peacebuilding processes, a concept in which I am also interested in this research. 
When locals have high expectations regarding the peacebuilding interventions, in Kosovo 
(Mahr, 2018) but also in Israel and Palestine as Aggestam and Strömbom (2013) argued, it is 
more likely to generate tensions, irritation, and frustration. Through a study on the peace NGOs 
in Israel and Palestine, they first demonstrate the importance of local NGOs that work towards 
peace at the grassroots level. Then, the second key argument, which is relevant to this study, is 
that there are different types of expectations regarding the peace in the region, they differ 
depending on the level they are coming from (political elites, various peace organizations…). 
The authors also argued that the peace NGOs have been excluded from official negotiations, 





Indications on the root causes of the tensions 
 
In the literature, previous research demonstrated the existence of tensions and contestations 
between local and global actors. However, so far local reactions to the mission’s deployment, 
in particular negative reactions, have received relatively little attention in the literature (Mahr, 
2018). Nevertheless, the few indications on the root causes of these tensions that emerged are 
relevant to this study. 
Regarding the EULEX mission and peacebuilding in Kosovo, the process was top-down, which 
led to a conflicting situation with the locals in addition to the initial conflict (Mahr, 2018). 
Interpretation of key provisions was very diverse depending on which party it was coming from 
– international third parties, Serbs, or Albanians (Bieber, 2015).  
By addressing the EULEX mission from a bottom-up perspective, the article written by Mahr 
(2018) underlines the limitations of EU policies in post-conflict Kosovo. First, the populations 
seemed to be supportive of the mission and it was endorsed at the highest political levels. 
However, it also met contestation by both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs from the very 
beginning. Local actors publicly demanded a change in the mission’s mandate and/or its 
operations. While the mission did not react to the public criticism, according to the locals it did 
not improve its performance, it led to their perception that EULEX failed in its tasks. The article 
investigates two possible reasons for contestation by a considerable part of the Kosovar society: 
EULEX’s perceived violation of sovereignty and its perceived lack of effectiveness. The author 
demonstrates that international peacebuilding activities have a direct impact on the ability of 
local authorities to exercise sovereignty in their country. Indeed, Vetëvendosje saw them as 
restricting Kosovo’s ability to govern itself, which in addition to the agreement to deploy 
EULEX under the status-neutral UN umbrella (and therefore not acknowledging the 
independence), triggered strong contestation. Regarding the lack of effectiveness of the 
mission, if international missions are perceived as ineffective, it likely creates a sense of 






Consequences and implications of the tensions 
 
In this last section of the theoretical framework will be presented the central concepts and 
arguments relevant to understand what consequences and implications these tensions can have 
on the peacebuilding efforts and the development of a society.  
 First, the potential circular effect of the perceived lack of effectiveness of the EULEX mission 
can be problematic. Indeed, if it leads to contestation it might in turn make the mission’s work 
more difficult, further hindering its effectiveness in the long run (Mahr, 2018). 
In the last two decades and especially in the last few years, scholars are increasingly arguing 
for peacebuilding that is essentially local. In an article that focuses on the local in peacebuilding 
as a means of emancipation and inclusion of local agency, scholars claim for peacebuilding that 
is essentially local and from below (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). If the tensions might lead to 
a change in the missions’ one should not forget that there are pitfalls and risks: Indigenous 
empowerment and the role of civil society and local cultural values in peacebuilding is not a 
straightforward and unproblematic issue (Ramsbotham et al., chapter 9, 2011). Indeed, the local 
actors can exploit the legitimacy of liberal institutions to advance their political interests or 
deny the pursuit of justice for the sake of short-term stability. This has happened in Cambodia, 
Kosovo, and Timor-Leste when the decisions of the local elite failed to reflect the local 
aspirations for justice and reconciliation (Simangan, 2017).  
Representations of the locals are conflictingly conducted by scholars, practitioners, and 
government officials, telling about the true, the good, and the bad local, empowering some and 
disempowering other actors, institutions, and practices. These dynamics have tangible effects 
on peace, conflict, and (in)security. This reflexive perspective on the ‘local’ in peacebuilding 
was introduced by Hirblinger & Simons (2015). The tensions raised by the lack of local 
involvement and the top-down approaches international interveners use too often are also 
raising legitimacy questions. This entails that not only the legitimacy and credibility of the 
international interveners are questioned, but the legitimacy of the (few) local actors supported 
and empowered by the international community can be seen as illegitimate as rule markers and 







After having presented the study objectives and the previous research and theoretical frame of 
this study, the different means for conducting the research are being addressed below. In order 
to address the tensions between interveners and local grassroots in an armed conflict context, I 
chose the case study of Kosovo, where the international interveners intervened at the end of the 
war to stop the violent conflict. 
A case study  
 
Regarding the research method and design, I conducted qualitative research, with a case study 
approach. This method allowed me to focus explicitly on a particular context, on dynamic 
interactions, and to favor intensity and depth, in the case of the interplay between local and 
global actors during the peacebuilding process in Kosovo. I am concentrating on a 
contemporary phenomenon, on the tensions that arose from the interaction between local and 
global players from 1999 until today, with a focus on the situation since 2008. The case study 
approach has been chosen, since it fits the study at hand exceptionally well, due to its flexibility. 
Considering the three sub-research-questions, respectively aimed to focus the study on the 
tensions and visions of peace, on the potential causes of those tensions, and finally on the 
different perspectives regarding the consequences of the tensions, a case study allowed me to 
collect the data I needed for this research. Indeed, a flexible sampling process and adaptable 
data collection tools were necessary to achieve a comprehensive picture of the situation in 
Kosovo. The case study also enabled the research to incorporate multiple perspectives, several 
empirical sources, and different interpretative strategies. To derive a comprehensive 
understanding of the matter, I went on a three-week research trip to Pristina and Belgrade. I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with thirteen different actors in the field and observed 
different environments, cultures, and behaviors in order to answer the following overarching 
research question.  
The topic of my research is sensitive and can therefore raise ethical issues. For instance, I chose 
to protect the interviewees and ensure their anonymity. By choosing to not cite any names nor 
the names of the organizations, media, or NGOs, some of the interviewees were working for, 




To get a deep understanding of the issue, I wish to explore this case as an illustration of a larger 
phenomenon, as the tensions between local and global actors were not only witness in Kosovo 
but also in Timor-Leste or Cambodia (Wallis, 2017; Simangan, 2017). The instrumental case 
study approach fits perfectly with the goal of my research since the details of this larger 
phenomenon can be illuminated while focusing on individuals (Stake, 2005). As mentioned, I 
also was able to choose different approaches. In the following paragraphs the choices regarding 
the overall design, the data collection method, and the analysis will be explained in detail. 
 
Sampling and data collection  
 
The choice of the site 
 
The choice of the site, in this case, Pristina and Belgrade was directly linked to the feasibility 
of the study. Considering the available limited time and budget for conducting this research, it 
was necessary to only focus on the most important sites. Conducting research in Pristina, the 
capital of Kosovo, was evident and necessary. Belgrade has been deeply marked by the NATO 
airstrike in 1999, as well as has been forever intertwined with the Kosovar situation. Being able 
to gather data on opinions of local grassroots subjects on the tensions between Serbs and the 
international community, but also to gain insights on the Serbian view of the Kosovo situation 
was highly relevant for the study. In Kosovo, the language barrier prevented me to reach and 
interview grassroots subjects in the Serbian community, which was more easily in Belgrade. 
Since this thesis is being written in the field of European Studies, examining a country located 
in the South of Europe, where the United Nations and the European Union are still operating in 
the field under the UNMIK and EULEX missions, seemed coherent and logical.  
 
Sampling of interview subjects 
 
For the sampling of the participants, I first used a criterion case sampling (Marshall, Rossman 
2016). From the beginning of the research process, I had important characteristics regarding the 
sampling of the data. Based on the analytical category called ethnicity, and since the conflict 
was mainly between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority as well as the international 




relevant choice in this case; however, they are not representative of the entire ethnic population, 
they are few voices that give some indications on the issue. Then, I used theoretical sampling 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016), which refers to the extraction of concepts and theories from the 
literature I have read and studied on this topic, to help me chose what kind of participants I 
wanted to interview. Which led me to concentrate on the opinions of grassroots subjects, people 
from the local population, not the political elite, because their vision and experience have been 
under research in the previous literature. This theoretical sampling choice was based on 
Lederach’s pyramid (Lederach, 1997), I was, therefore, able to distinguish the different actors 
in peacebuilding and identify the people I needed to interview in order the answer the research 
question. According to the research aim, the focus was on the grassroots subjects’ experience 
regarding the intervention of the United Nations, NATO through their KFOR operations, and 
the European Union through their EULEX mission. Moreover, in order to answer the research 
question properly, I decided to include the insights from international peacebuilders, whom I 
also interviewed during the time I had in the field.    
Once I arrived, for three weeks of field research, I had the opportunity to meet unexpected 
people through the persons I had previously interviewed, therefore I was able to do chain or 
snowball sampling (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The different contacts I made there were 
pertinent and helped me a lot in my research.  
The local actors I interviewed at the grassroots level are journalists, local NGOs employees, 
members of the civil society, artists… As for the international interveners, they are from 
different nationalities, and for the most part present in Kosovo since the intervention of the 
United Nations in 1999. 
It is relevant to mention the involvement of both women and men in the empirical study. As 
gender issues are relevant in peace and conflict studies, the participants were half women and 
half men, both among international peacebuilders and local grassroots subjects interviewed. 
 
Data collection  
 
Regarding the selection of a specific data collection method, the case study approach allowed 
me to be flexible in this matter as well. For my research, blending genres was necessary. Within 
the case study on the situation in Kosovo, I used an ethnographic approach, as I studied human 
groups and analyzed their actions and interactions (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The 




observation, and document analysis, to understand the cultural aspects of the tensions between 
local and global actors. In addition to that, I used, to a smaller extent, the critical discourse 
analysis, as I included official documents, the reports of the Security Council of the United 
Nations on the UNMIK mission3 , as secondary data. It has been relevant to get a further 
understanding of the international organization’s position on different tensions and issues that 
arose during the last two decades. I could also identify the strategy of the international 
organization, as well as reveal and confront dominant discourses and ideologies. It is an 
effective method for the study of language and power (Rogers, 2004). The triangulation, the 
use of different methods to collect data, ensured the validity of my research. It was a useful way 
to assert the credibility of the interpretation as well. Mixing and blending methods allowed me 
to test the validity through the convergence or divergence of information that were coming from 
different empirical sources (Yin, 2014). 
The overall strategy for data collection was in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
individuals, to discuss the shared matters of interests on the peace intervention, and to share 
point of views (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). I constructed the interviews with the same frame 
(see Appendix 3), with important issues I wanted to ask, such as how the local population lived, 
experienced, and felt about the intervention of Western organizations in the conflict and 
especially after the conflict. But also, on the effectiveness of the missions and of course the 
tensions they arose. Although some pre-structured themes were systematically brought up in 
each interview, in order to ensure efficient data analysis, the semi-structured interview method 
also leaves space for the unexpected, for the interviewees to add anything they would find 
relevant (Galletta & Cross, 2013). They also shared many personal memories, from 1999 until 
today, which I could not predict in advance, therefore the semi-structured interviews helped me 
to gain insights into dimensions I had not considered in advance. Next to the semi-structured 
interviews, a few informal interviews (conversations) with different people once operating in 
the field as well as researchers (via e-mail) were included in the empirical material. As I was in 
the field, I also used observation and some field notes, which completed the interviews 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). For instance, I traveled around Pristina and to Gračanica, a 
Serbian enclave in Northern Kosovo. Taking notes of my observations and including them in 
the research enabled me to derive a comprehensive understanding of the situation. Finally, I 
resorted to official reports from the Security Council of the United Nations, as mentioned above, 
 




to get the full picture and inform the research questions. It allowed me to compare the 
testimonies of the different interviewees to the official reports of the Security Council, to show 
discrepancies or similarities. which were a great source of information as well as neutral on the 
tensions between local and global actors. Further details and information on the empirical 
material can be found in Appendix 3. 
Analysis 
 
Regarding the analysis part, I first proceeded with manual coding of all the interviews and 
documents. I created coding tables, and I organized the data into thematic categories. I mixed 
both inductive and deductive coding. I had a general direction in mind, I made pre-categories 
from the theoretical framework and the knowledge based on the interviews, the field notes, and 
the documents from my field research. Then, I opened the coding and from the data material, I 
got new categories and themes as well as confirmation of my pre-categories (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2016).  
The overall themes, according to the empirical sources, that emerged from the coding process 
were the following:  
1. The frustration and disappointment of the locals and their high expectations toward 
international interventions and the political elite.     
2. Tensions and altercations between locals and international actors. 
3. The agenda of Western organizations. 
4. The success of the international community. 
5. The limits of the success of the international community. 
6. The questions of sovereignty and status. 
7. The status neutral of the United Nations.  
8. The accountability of Western organizations. 
 
These categories were designed to guide the empirical analysis to answer the research question 
and the three sub-research-questions. Moreover, using open coding helped me to get and 
develop key ideas from the data, to see certain patterns that I would not have noticed with 
deductive coding. However, this process was informal, organizing the data was essential, such 
as making lists and notes through the whole process so I would be able to add new categories 




know the data very well in order to analyze and especially interpret it. Not using any software 
to code was maybe time-consuming but enabled a full immersion of the data.  
The indicators that guided the analysis, through the coding process and the interpretation, were 
first based on the overall themes presented above, and then I systematically referred to the three 
sub-research-questions to ensure the fulfillment of the research aims.   
The interpretation came as a natural process through the data collection phase; however, 
I reserved all the thoughts for the analysis part. The interpretation and analysis were both 
deductive and inductive. I used the data to test theories and hypotheses; it was mainly aimed at 
finding the causalities of the tensions between local and global actors. Interpreting is telling the 
story that is behind the data collected. It demands a cautious analysis, since, to ensure 
trustfulness, I need to discuss other alternatives to be sure that the argument I am presenting is 
going to be valid and sound and to be sure that another theory and/or argument is not preferable. 
I looked for similar arguments and claims among the interviewees, through the official 
documents and my observations, but also opposite and conflicting opinions regarding peace 
visions, tensions, and their potential causes and implications. Then, from the previous research 
in this field, I could test the theories, while comparing and examining the empirical material to 
find out similarities and theoretical implications, which will be presented in the conclusion of 
this paper. This is what Yin (2014) is calling “examining plausible rival explanations and 
interpretations”. I used the analytical strategy of “pattern matching” (Yin, 2014, p.130-136) in 
order to compare an empirical pattern with an expected or predicted one, from the previously 
studied literature and from the arguments that were being put forward before starting the 
research. While using an ethnographic approach, it has been a useful tool for empirical analysis, 
as I could analyze interaction patterns within the communities and organizations. The critical 
discourse analysis of the SG reports from UNMIK were very informative regarding the 
language used by international peacebuilders, as well as on the power relations between local 
and global actors in the field. 
I also compared different case studies, based on the literature (Wallis, 2017; Simangan, 2017), 
to link the Kosovo case to other peacebuilding processes in the world, such as in Timor-Leste 
and Cambodia, as mentioned above. Then, I went further in the analysis, by including an 
inductive approach, that became the main tool for the analysis. Based on the method from 
Marshall & Rossman (2016), I also researched what is called “theoretical sufficiency”. As I 




further data collection, this was the point called “saturation”. In other words, more data would 
just lead to the same findings.  
Limitations of the study 
 
In the following part, I am going to discuss the limitations of the study, to demonstrate that I 
understood the reality of the qualitative research I conducted. Given the particular context of 
Kosovo, the time I had to conduct the study as well as the choice of samples, the study can 
show some limits. The opinions expressed by the participants are not representative of the 
whole population’s opinion, however, it has the capacity to inform and give indications on how 
the tensions are understood. I also chose to interview and focus on the main parties involved in 
the conflict (Albanians, Serbs, and international peacebuilders). Inputs from the other 
communities living in Kosovo could have perhaps been relevant to some extent. While the 
findings may be transferable to another case, the study cannot be overweening generalized as it 
is bounded and situated in a specific context (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The qualitative 
approach allowed me to study the phenomenon from the participants’ perspectives. The purpose 
is to give a voice to local grassroots subjects, and to compare their point of view to international 
peacebuilders, all this process through semi-structured interviews. I am only looking at the 
interplay between local grassroots subjects and international organizations and therefore, I will 
not examine the impact other (neighbor) countries are having on the situation. To get a wider 
perspective from more participants, the case study approach allows the researcher to mix both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. However, I chose not to include a quantitative approach, 
which would have been not only difficult given the time of the research but less relevant for the 
study. I, therefore, privileged the quality of the empirical sources over the quantity.  
Another issue that I realized once in the field, even if most people could speak basic English, 
is the language barrier that sometimes made the connection and discussion a bit more difficult, 
as I could not ask as many deep questions as I wanted. But it only happened twice over the 
twelve interviews I conducted. Regarding my role as a researcher and the potential biases I had, 
except for the passion and excitement I had for the research project, I do not have any roots in 
the region. I became personally involved in the topic, as I spend some time in the field, listening 
to people’s stories and personal experiences. However, I ensured that I kept the role of the 




Presentation of the empirical data  
 
This is a case study of one case in which tensions emerged from the interplay between 
international interveners and local actors. In my contribution, I will expose in the empirical 
findings the results of the interviews I conducted with local grassroots subjects and international 
peacebuilders, in perspective with the official documents analyzed (SG reports from UNMIK4). 
Then, in a discussion section, I will discuss those findings more reflexively.  
First, I would like to briefly present some factual elements about the conflict and the 
intervention, for the reader to have a full understanding of the context. The conflict started in 
February 1998, opposing the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and 
Montenegro), which controlled Kosovo before the war, and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), a Kosovo Albanian rebel group. The disputed territory, the region of Kosovo, was 
inhabited by a majority of Kosovo-Albanians, with the presence of other communities such as 
Serbs, Romas, Egyptians, and Bosnians. The conflict resulted in thousands of lives lost. This is 
without counting wounded and assaulted women, men, and children. Thousands of people have 
been displaced during the conflict and the returning process was facilitated by the United 
Nations that ensured the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees. Since the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 2008 and the growing influence of the self-determination 
party Vetëvendosje, the tasks carried out by the UNMIK staff have considerably diminished, 
the powers have been transferred to the new local institutions. However, the international 
community is still present today in Kosovo, their mission mainly consists of supporting and 
advising the local government, in the protection of human rights, as the cohabitation of Serbs 
and Albanians within the territory can trigger violent episodes, and in working on the trust-
building between the different communities.  
Empirical findings 
 
In the following section, I am going to expose my empirical findings, that I organized into three 
thematic sections, which I also divided under different subheadings, following my research 
objectives. First, I will concentrate on the different tensions between local and global actors, 
 




then I will address the potential causes of those tensions according to the different people I 
interviewed, and eventually, I will focus on the perspectives of the interviewees on the 
consequences of the international community’s missions. The construction of the empirical 
findings has been primarily guided by the empirical findings from the interviews I conducted 
in Pristina and Belgrade. The locals and international interveners I interviewed expressed their 
opinion and feelings, they are not representative of the whole population. However, it gave me 
the necessary indications and insights regarding the thesis argument.  
From tensions to frustration 
 
There have been undeniable tensions over the last two decades between international 
interveners and the local population in the region of Kosovo. And there are not only tensions, 
there is also a growing feeling of frustration as well, which the participants expressed clearly 
during the data collection process. 
Tensions and altercations between local and international actors 
 
The tensions between local and global actors have been more or less visible over the years. 
They have been witnessed on both sides of the conflict, among the Kosovo-Albanians, the 
Kosovo-Serbs, and the Serbs. These resentments did not fade over the years and the 
international actors had to face the critics, the violence, and the resistance from different local 
communities. From the interviews I have conducted in Pristina and Belgrade, the different 
interviewees mentioned several events where the tensions with the international organizations 
were at their peak. The incidents have been confirmed and verified by the SG reports from 
UNMIK, which I used as secondary data. 
During a meeting in Pristina with two employees from a local NGO, they described the 
international missions as “unclear”. Unclear in a sense where the international organizations 
do not have a clear goal, or at least they do not present it formally to the society they are 
intervening in. Therefore, in Pristina and across the Kosovo region, the tensions stem from the 
lack of results from various missions. The tensions were always present, however, sometimes 
less noticeable. The local employee from the NGO specified her point with a concrete example: 
“When Vetëvendosje burnt and put up-side-down EULEX cars the tensions were obviously 




August 2009, when around sixty Vetëvendosje self-determination activists vandalized 26 
EULEX vehicles in broad daylight in Pristina. In the following days, several acts of vandalism 
against EULEX and UNMIK were recorded, and until the 14th of September 2009 more than a 
thousand demonstrators called for the withdrawal of EULEX from Kosovo (SG report UNMIK 
S/2009/497).  
As we can see, the altercations that resulted from these tensions have been tainted by 
violence. The balance of power and forces is rather unequal, an argument that I will illustrate 
with the incident of 27th September 2011 in Jarinje, Northern Kosovo, and Metohija. The 
following event was reported to me through an interview with a Serbian researcher. On that 
day, local Serbs organized civil protests, and the reason for it was the previous arrest of a person 
of Serbian nationality reported to have "attacked" an armed US soldier. Serb protesters threw 
rocks and KFOR responded with tear gas. German KFOR continued using tear gas and US 
combat soldiers emerged and pointed weapons at the civilians already trying to move away 
from the gas. At that point, gunfire was heard - live ammo and rubber bullets - and the truck 
driver was shot. The Serbs then ran from the scene as they could not compete with the 
international forces’ weapons (interview n°11). The tensions among the Serbian population and 
the international interveners started already in 1999 right after the NATO bombing. Indeed, a 
Serbian journalist made clear that since 1999 the relations between Serbia and the United States 
of America are “broken and non-reconcilable” (interview n°10).  
It becomes clear that international actors had to face violent episodes with the Serb and 
the Albanian community. These outbreaks of violence are not yet in the past for the population 
of Kosovo and the international interveners in the field, as the last SG report from UNMIK 
reported another incident against international forces in May 2019. In its report, the Secretary-
General stated that “The arrest and detention of UNMIK staff members on 28th May 2019, the 
injuries they suffered and the continued legal proceedings against them by Kosovo authorities 
are of serious concern.” (SG report UNMIK S/2019/797). These violent events are a direct 
expression of the tensions and are unfortunately not isolated. The different international 
organizations present to this day in the region did put an end to the conflict in 1999, but ever 
since their actions have been triggers to large protests and violent altercations. The tensions did 




large feeling of frustration among the local grassroots subjects interviewed and the different 
communities. 
The frustration and disappointment of the local population 
 
The locals had high expectations towards the international interveners and their missions. In 
other words, they saw the international organizations as “saviors” when they arrived in 1999 in 
Kosovo, and deeply believed they will help them not only to stop the violent conflict but to 
reduce corruption and inequalities (Interview n°7). However, when the missions failed to meet 
the expectations of the population of Kosovo, this feeling of frustration and disappointment 
rapidly spread across the region. Unfortunately, the locals lost faith in those missions, they were 
disappointed and felt let down, which was a point of no return in the relationship between global 
and local players. During the field trip to Kosovo, I encountered several people expressing a 
feeling of “frustration” and “disappointment” towards the international community. One major 
member of this community since 2008 is the European Union, through its EULEX rule of law 
mission, and they are facing a lot of critics.  
From what I heard and witnessed in Kosovo, EULEX raised a lot of frustration on 
different levels among the population. Regarding the technical aspects of the mission, an 
employee from a local NGO in Pristina mentioned during an interview that: “Everyone had 
high expectations, especially regarding the EU. It was a big disappointment; the EU did not 
bring any higher level of officials in the field. In ten years EULEX did not close one case” 
(interview n°3). The Albanian grassroots subjects interviewed had clear goals in mind regarding 
the actions of the European Union in matters of justice: “When the EU came to Kosovo, they 
promised a lot, people had high hopes. They said that they will catch big fishes from the political 
elite, but they disappointed everyone” (interview n°6). They were expecting the prosecution of 
the corrupted political elite. Instead, EULEX prosecuted Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
veterans from the 1999 war, which was not what the Albanian community expected from the 
European Union: “The people are frustrated, especially about EULEX failure. They do not want 
to send KLA soldiers to court, but the corrupted elite” (interview n°7).  
The absence or failure in the prosecution of the corrupted elite is directly linked to an 
extremely important issue to the young citizen of Kosovo: their inability to travel without a 




in Pristina, this was a central issue for them and is still a significant source of frustration. Indeed: 
“Kosovo population is still unable to travel, due to the low rule of law and high corruption in 
the country and they are now blaming the EU that did not stop the corruption” (interview n°6). 
Reasons for the visa-situation, as put forward by the EU and the international community, are 
e.g. too much corruption and an unstable state (interview n°6). But the population is wondering: 
“why do we have less than Romania, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro…?” (interview n°6) and that 
“it is not by isolating people that they [the international community] will get somewhere!” 
(interview n°7). It also has an impact on the professional lives of the local grassroots subjects, 
the editor in chief of a local journal is deeply affected, frustrated and very concerned: “How 
can I be a successful journalist when I cannot attend a conference in Berlin?” (interview n°6). 
They are waiting for a change, for the international community to stand for the freedom of the 
Kosovo citizens. 
Another source of frustration that has been brought up a couple of times is the potential 
involvement of EULEX in corruption cases. The locals interviewed strongly believe that 
“EULEX was involved in corruption scandals” (interview n°6) and therefore increased the 
disappointment and frustration, as the population was already struggling with a corrupted 
political elite. This is a different issue that would require further research and it is not directly 
linked to the study I am conducting, however, worth to be mentioned. 
It seems that the frustration and disappointment mainly come from: “poor people with no 
or small education tend to have high hopes” (Interview n°6). In reality, their expectations 
towards the European Union were very high, leading to a major disappointment, when those 
were not fulfilled. We can also question if the expectations of the locals were in adequation 
with the real aims of the global actors and their missions. Indeed, what the people expected and 
wanted from the international interveners differ from their global agenda, as I will address it in 
the following section.  
The causes of the tensions according to the interviewees 
 
In this second thematic section, I will expose the causes and reasons for those tensions, based 
on the different interviews and the personal experience of the local grassroots subjects and the 




account the interests of the population seems to be a major issue in Kosovo, as the locals I 
interviewed made clear.  
I will divide this section into three subheadings, representing the three major points 
mentioned in the interviews, starting from the problem of the agenda of the Western 
organization not reflecting what the locals want and instead put the international community’s 
interests first. Then I will address the issues of sovereignty and status, which are also part of 
the locals’ interests. I will finish this section by exposing the critics regarding the supposed 
“status neutral” of the United Nations, which apparently also led to some tensions between local 
and global actors. 
The agenda of international organizations 
 
The agenda of the Western organizations has been described as one if not the main cause of 
tensions between local and global actors by the local grassroots subjects I interviewed. I will 
first focus on the respect of the interests and needs of the local population (mainly Serbs and 
Albanians) and if they have been taken into accounts and included in the agenda of the 
international organizations during this peacebuilding and peacekeeping process. Then, I will 
address the non-respect of the culture and traditions, an issue that has been mentioned during 
the interviews and is seen by the interviewees as a cause of the tensions as well. International 
organizations tend to have their own agenda, an agenda that has been determined by officials 
often far away from the war-torn countries in question. The local grassroots participants 
complained about a gap between the agenda and aims of the international community and the 
actual needs and interests of the local population. The locals did not and still do not feel heard 
by the global actors who intervene in their post-conflict society. The results of the empirical 
study did confirm the argument outlined earlier in this thesis. In the following paragraphs, I will 
report the point of view, often very personal, of the different interviewees regarding the agenda 
of the Western organizations.  
Very early in the research process, a Serbian ex-journalist did confirm the argument by 
claiming that the international interveners “have their own interests that are always first on the 
agenda” (interview n°2). Indeed, the locals seem to know that the European Union and the 
United Nations are much bigger players on the international scene. A local activist and NGO 




[…] small nations are tailored by big ones - it has always been like that”. He has accepted the 
fact that “we were not high on the agenda” (interview n°3).  
However, even if the local grassroots subjects are aware of the strategy of the liberal 
peacebuilders, they did not all accept it either, hence the tensions with the international 
interveners. The “one-size-fits-all” strategy is a major concern for the two employees of a local 
NGO in Pristina as they argued during our meeting that the agenda of the United Nations had 
only one strategy, the same as in other countries (i.e. Timor-Leste; Simangan, 2017), with very 
specific objectives that are not in consideration of the context. EULEX and UNMIK have their 
own interests on top of their “checklists” as they called it, a term that arose during other 
interviews as well (interview n°7 & 10). In Belgrade, a Serbian journalist could not agree more 
with this argument, for him, the diplomats want to achieve a mission, they have clear leadership 
goals: “They need and want a deal to calm the tensions even if it is not acceptable to the local 
population that has to live with it. Then they come back to Brussels or New York and show that 
they achieved the goal. Which is great on paper but very different in reality” (interview n°10). 
A Kosovo – Albanian editor-in-chief also added that “they were only interested in the success 
of the mission on paper […] they were too focused on peace: stuck in this idea of no more war 
in the region that they went too far […]” (interview n°6).  
When the international interveners are focusing on the local population, it also raised 
some critics as “They are mostly working with minorities. The organizations were also blinded 
by the goal of creating a multi-ethnic relation” (interview n°6), which is not what the Albanian 
community wanted from them. They wanted help in state-building, in putting an end to the 
violent episodes, in the protection of human rights. “The people wanted a State, but this is not 
our State”, here the interviewee is referring to the Kosovo flag and the circumstances of its 
creation. The population had no choice, it was presented to them “look this is your flag” 
(interview n°6) on Independence Day. For them, it felt like no one listened nor cared about their 
voices and interests. He concluded by saying that “the international community, sometimes 
through the local elite, is considering the people stupid and they are imposing everything. The 
State is like a mosaic: a non-finished work and built in a hurry. There was no love nor 
dedication put in the work. The international actors wanted to not fail for themselves, they did 




major issues in its state-building process, politics are tainted by corruption, personal interests, 
and poor justice. 
The agenda of the Western organizations operating in Kosovo should have evolved over 
the years, especially in such a unique political and ethnic context. It has been twenty years, and 
at some point “they should have to rethink their position, their mission, which they did not do” 
(interview n°7). There were so many players (local grassroots people, NGOs, the United 
Nations, NATO, the political elite, the European Union, etc.) that in order to provide the proper 
help, they need to adapt to the constantly evolving politics and also to understand the culture - 
which UNMIK and EULEX are not doing (interview n°6 & 7). The missions depend on the 
mandate of the United Nations, under the resolution 1244 from 1999. Every slightest change 
and modification regarding the mandate goals’ and the missions must be approved within the 
Security Council of the United Nations, and the international community did not agree on the 
Kosovo case since 1999, therefore the mandate has not been changed. UNMIK is well aware 
of the challenges and its necessity to rethink the mission, in an SG report from 2008, the 
Secretary-General clearly stated that “The United Nations is confronting a new reality in 
Kosovo, with operational implications for UNMIK that it must take into account. It is my 
assessment that not doing so could lead to increased tension in Kosovo, including, among 
Kosovo communities, and would contribute to an unwelcoming environment for the 
international civil presence” (SG report UNMIK S/2008/354). The international community 
should stand for the Kosovo citizens’ freedom and focus on essential issues of our times (i.e. 
the traveling visas), however we do not have to forget that they have a twenty years old mandate 
which does not allow them to intervene on everything. We can witness here a coherence 
between the different parties’ speeches; however, the international community did not manage 
to agree on any measures nor engagements to improve its mission and therefore the relations 
with the local communities. 
Moreover, the locals mentioned during the interviews that the lack of knowledge of 
cultures and traditions of the local Kosovo population by the international interveners is a 
source of tensions. They did not take all the particularities of the society and its culture into 
account when establishing their agenda. In a region such as the Western Balkans, religions and 
ethnic groups coexist, and those communities have different cultures and traditions. Kosovo is 




other, but Bosniaks, Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, Gorani, and Romani too. In 1999, diplomats, 
peacebuilders, and soldiers from across the world came without knowing anything – the 
cultures, the traditions, and what the people have been through. In an interview, a local 
grassroots subject told me that there were restaurants and social events only reserved for the 
internationals, and besides work, they had no interactions with the locals (interview n°6). The 
principal critic has been that the international community “did not know anything - and still do 
not - about the culture and the traditions in Kosovo. They rejected to know and to understand, 
and it is when they started to fail” (interview n°6). According to local grassroots subjects 
interviewed in Pristina, the ignorance of the Western organizations and their reluctance to adapt 
their missions with the reality on the field is not only a major source of tensions but a reason 
for the missions’ failure. I will come back to this argument later in the last thematic section.  
The population of Kosovo expressed its discontentment quite clearly and loudly by 
electing a new Prime Minister in October 2019, Albin Kurti, who is the leader of Vetëvendosje 
and a former rebel: “He was on the streets protesting for those issues because the international 
actors had their interests first on the agenda” and did not respect the local population’s interests 
(interview n°7). It is important to mention that Kosovo needs international aid, to improve and 
ensure the security and the protection of human rights, especially with all the ethnic groups 
living close to each other. They do not reject the international presence, as global actors ensure 
the security of the different communities and protect their human rights. However, the 
interviewees from both the Serb and Albanian communities reject their manners and their 
agenda. Indeed, at the end of an interview with two employees of a local NGO, one of them 
said quite rightly “Kosovo needs international aid”, and also mentioned that the international 
programs are good, “the humanitarian ones, until they get political” (interview n°7). Everything 
is up to the political level, political elite and international interveners seem to quickly forget the 
humanitarian aspect of their missions. Their intervention also raised critics and discontent 
regarding the sovereignty and Kosovo’s status questions, which also reflects the interests of the 
local population, which leads me to the next part of this section. 
Sovereignty and status in Kosovo 
 
The local grassroots subjects I interviewed in Pristina denounced the inadequacy of the 
international interveners’ agenda with the interests of the society they are intervening in. This 




generated a public rejection of the international organizations, according to the interviewees, 
because they put a curb on their political and independence aspirations. 
The global actors I met in the field are aware of those critics and the tensions it 
engendered. In 2008, after the unilateral declaration of independence, the political leaders of 
Kosovo and the population considered UNMIK over. Indeed, the police were leaving and 90% 
of the employees left. They were hoping to get full sovereignty at the political and judiciary 
levels. However, when the political elite did not get what they wanted, they rejected the 
international presence. In an interview with an international peacebuilder, he added that “the 
local political leaders claimed to not need UNMIK anymore. It led to difficulties working for 
the UNMIK staff that was still working in the field. UNMIK was not welcome. These tensions 
were top-down, it was only coming from the political elite that did not consult the population 
before resisting to the UNMIK actions” (interview n°4). Just like UNMIK, EULEX was 
targeted and blamed for the locals’ lack of authority and power. Indeed, EULEX has “an 
executive mandate and some people were not supporting it” (interview n°8). There were 
protests against EULEX because it impeached the sovereignty of Kosovo in the judiciary area. 
But since 2018, all judiciary authorities were transferred to local institutions, and EULEX is 
“only here to assist” (interview n°8).  
According to the editor in chief of a local journal, the only way to not have their 
sovereignty impeached and limited is if “the international interveners leave” (interview n°6). 
The locals and especially the self-determination party Vetëvendosje do not want the 
international community involved in internal affairs (interview n°9) anymore. Even if the 
international interveners transferred the power gradually to the local institutions since 2000, the 
process has been too slow for the locals. They wanted and expected a lot from the international 
intervention since the beginning, but the missions were prolonged (interview n°7). They did not 
accept the fact that the Kosovo authorities could not fully govern the State by themselves, even 
if they were or still are not ready to do so. A lack of authority and power is not helping to 
improve the position of Kosovo on the international scene. Its status is very poor: “Kosovo is 
lacking status to the international community’s eyes” (interview n°7). Moreover, “Serbia has 
been campaigning against the recognition of Kosovo as a country and in certain cases for the 
withdrawal of the recognition”, and they have been quite successful so far (interview n°10). 




lack of sovereignty within the territory and the agenda of the Western organizations did not 
encourage a change of status on the international scene. It has generated tensions with the 
international communities as well as frustration as we have seen in the previous section. The 
fact that after twenty years the local authorities are still lacking a status has an impact on the 
everyday life of the citizens, on tourism, on the economy, and is also blocking the country from 
having a voice on the international scene. Kosovo is therefore not part of Interpol, the European 
Union, or NATO just to name a few. And unfortunately, without an official and recognized 
status, it is even harder for a small nation to be on top of the agenda. It is linked to the previous 
findings, that according to the interviewees the locals do not feel heard, they had expectations 
regarding their sovereignty as a new country and a goal to have a proper status.  
The locals gained autonomy over the years, but did not yet get their entire sovereignty 
back, they still feel bound to the international’s opinion and decisions, which resulted in a lack 
of trust towards the global actors and their real aims. It does not mean that all relations between 
local and global actors are altered completely, for instance, the relations between UNMIK and 
the Albanian community is certainly not as good as it was before the unilateral declaration of 
independence but there is still an interplay. Indeed, “it is more informal and non-public 
relations […] UNMIK is working low-profile with Albanian community and political leaders 
because they are not welcome in public” (interview n°4). The major concern of the experts and 
international peacebuilders is whether the government is ready to sustainably govern and run 
the institutions that were established by UNMIK. To this day, the international organizations 
are mainly supporting and advising the locals on political, judicial, and economic matters, 
however, they are quite doubtful about the ability of the government to manage everything on 
its own (interview n°4 & 5). 
While interviewing the different people during the field trip in Belgrade and Pristina, 
concerns were raised not only regarding Kosovo’s status but concerning the “status neutral” of 
the United Nations, which EULEX is depending on too.  
The status neutral of the United Nations 
 
Under the resolution 1244 adopted on the 10th of June 1999 by the Security Council, the United 
Nations claimed its “status neutral” position towards the conflict. It is a cornerstone of the 




than twenty years now. The United Nations has always clearly stated its “status neutral” 
regarding the different parties involved in the conflict, they promised to respect the integrity of 
the nations and to not create any obstacles to peace, trust, and state-building. A Serbian 
journalist confirmed that the “United Nations are not imposing any solution; it is a neutral 
organization” (interview n°10). During an interview with an international peacebuilder, the 
mandate from the United Nations and the 1244 resolution was a central topic. He insisted on 
the fact that: “UNMIK is a status neutral mission”. The international organization and all the 
employees are bound to the 1244 resolution; therefore, they always have the challenging task 
to stay neutral and impartial. In a post-conflict society with such a unique context, the security 
of the population is at stake, even twenty years later. UNMIK must stay neutral to prevent 
triggering events between the different ethnic groups and not becoming the violence’s trigger. 
For instance, UNMIK has and will always refer to Kosovo as “Kosovo” and not as “the 
Republic of Kosovo”. Sometimes UNMIK has to use language tricks or “language massages” 
in the drafting of agreements to be signed by Serbia and Kosovo, and in that case, they will 
refer to the “authorities in Pristina” and not to the “Republic of Kosovo”. According to the 
international peacebuilders I interviewed, it is always to help and find practical solutions for 
the population, even if the Albanian community in Kosovo was not happy with those solutions 
and the language chosen (interviews n°4 & 5).  
We can question this supposed “status neutral”, which has been generating tensions 
between the local population and the Western organizations, as the different communities 
repeatedly felt disadvantaged, ignored, and forgotten compared to other communities. There is 
a gap between how Serbs and Albanians perceive security and on how the international 
interveners should “protect” and “support” them. Indeed, the international interveners are stuck 
in the middle, for instance, the NATO bombing in 1999 has been perceived as positive and 
necessary by the Albanian community while the Serbian community denounced it as unfair, 
violent, and unlawful. Nowadays, from a Kosovo -Albanian perspective, they blame UNMIK 
for “mostly working with minorities” (interview n°6) and therefore “hurting the normal inter-
ethnic relations by privileging minorities” (interview n°7). When Kosovo – Albanians, who are 
the most represented community with 92,9% of Kosovo’s population are criticizing UNMIK 
for being biased and acting in favor of the minorities, the Serbs from Northern Kosovo also 
complain about EULEX which “despite operating within the status-neutral framework of the 




Kosovo authorities” (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). A petition campaign has even been 
launched at the time against EULEX in Northern Kosovo (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). The 
United Nations’ neutrality has been challenged, especially since 2008, and the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo. The Serb community is aware of the important role of 
the United Nations and the European Union in everyday security and in providing some stability 
since “good faith” between the communities is not restored yet (interview n°4 & 11). However, 
a Serbian researcher pointed out that in his opinion, the international organizations are: “in clear 
breach of their mandate since 2008, as UNMIK was formed under the resolution 1244 of the 
Security Council in 1999, which expressed respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic 
of Serbia. Since the local authorities in Pristina have proclaimed unilaterally independence in 
2008, the continuous support of UNMIK for the operation of these authorities cannot be neutral 
any longer and they have clearly sided with secessionist authorities” (interview n°11). On both 
sides, they are accusing the international actors of favoring one community over another one in 
their mission and the implementation of projects and security measures. As I have limited my 
interviews and research to the opinions and experiences of the Albanian and Serb communities, 
I do not have data regarding the other communities, however, when I interviewed international 
peacebuilders, their projects seemed to be centered on Serb or Albanian communities. 
Nowadays, UNMIK’s main focus is to work on the trust-building between the communities, to 
lead the way towards better cohabitation and cooperation in society.  
International actors have been facing many critics over the last two decades in Kosovo. 
During the interviews, the local grassroots subjects blamed them for not putting the locals’ 
interests first on their agenda, they blamed them for restraining the new country’s sovereignty, 
they blamed them for Kosovo’s lack of international status and all the issues it generates. And 
they blamed them for not being neutral and impartial. On the other hand, UNMIK and the other 
international organizations in the field have a limited mandate, they are trying to navigate 
through the different missions and stay impartial, which can be a real challenge. It has 
engendered tensions, frustration, and disappointment among the different communities. 
Therefore, the success of the missions has been questioned and their flaws brought to light 
while I was conducting the interviews. Considering that the actions, decisions, and declarations 
of the international interveners have been a great source of tensions between them and the 
locals, the interviewees perceived and described the consequences of those missions, which I 




Perspectives of the interviewees on the outcomes and implications of the 
missions 
 
After having exposed the tensions between global and local actors and discussed what the 
interviewees understood as the causes, the last section of my empirical findings will address the 
different perspectives of the participants on the consequences and the results of the international 
actors’ intervention not only on the missions but on the society and the development of Kosovo.  
I wanted to include a more moderate and balanced opinion and interpretation of the empirical 
findings, as the results of the interviews pointed out that the perceptions of the consequences of 
the missions are quite diverse. If we cannot ignore the fact that the intervention of global actors 
in the regions arose many tensions with the local actors due to their lack of knowledge and often 
lack of consideration of the local population, we also cannot ignore that they succeed to some 
extent in their peacebuilding missions. While I was in the field, arguments in favor of the 
international community’s actions and their results were mentioned and will be the focus of the 
first part of this section. Nevertheless, interviewees revealed that those missions were not a 
complete success, the international community failed on many levels, which I will address in 
the second part of this section. I will conclude this empirical section by discussing the 
accountability of the international interveners, an issue that has been brought up a few times 
during the interviews, and that called for further reflections.  
The success of Western organizations 
 
In the previous sections, I exposed the opinions of local grassroots subjects and international 
interveners regarding the different missions the international community is conducting in 
Kosovo. Even if they are to blame for their actions, their inadequate agenda, and the way they 
are handling the missions, they did put an end to the violent conflict. They have been helpful in 
a region where everything was destroyed, where violence was peaking, and they made the 
territory safer for the population.  
When I interviewed international interveners, who have been in the region since 1999, 
they insisted on the success of global actors in putting an end to the conflict and in improving 
the security for the local population. The United Nations staff arrived in 1999 in a “devastated 




electricity) to the legal system and the currency. Their role was to create institutions and recruit 
local people to work for it: “It was always meant to be temporary and transitional” (interview 
n°4). They started the transfer of power to the Kosovo authorities in 2000. The mission is 
considered a success in the long run, even if “there is still a need for improvement” according 
to the international peacebuilders I met in Pristina (interviews n°4 & 5).  
Their most significant success goes back to 1999 when international peacebuilders 
arrived in Kosovo under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (1244). NATO, 
through KFOR its peace-leading operation, and UNMIK were the first and main responders to 
the conflict and had the goal to stop the conflict and ensure peace, safety, and stability in the 
region. When Western organizations arrived, the employee of a local NGO told me that “they 
were like saviors, everything was going to be okay”. She also remembered that Albanian 
refugees came back right after the international troupes arrived, they trusted UNMIK and 
NATO with their safety (interview n°7). In a more critical tone, the editor in chief of a local 
paper talked about the NATO bombing in 1999 as an episode that “made them look like saviors 
in Kosovo” (interview n°7), a comment I will discuss in the last part of this section. The 
UNHCR organization must be mentioned, which provided assistance over the last two decades 
to both Albanians and Serbs when they needed it the most. Their work has been recognized by 
the different communities, and a Serbian journalist also added at the very end of the interview 
that “the United Nations is doing OK and the UNHCR took care of the Serbian refugees coming 
back from Kosovo” (interview n°10) which is not claiming their success out loud but still 
recognizing some good actions from the international community. 
Since 2008 and the unilateral declaration of independence, the international community 
is mostly working to protect minorities, especially the Serb community. Indeed, they became 
the main targets for the Kosovo Albanians who did not accept the presence of Serbs in Kosovo. 
The relations between UNMIK and Serbs have improved as they need protection from the 
United Nations and its presence to stay safe. They are the minority and aware that UNMIK is a 
guarantor for their human rights. During the interviews with international peacebuilders, they 
pointed out their important role as mediators, they “maintain communication and peace 
between communities and prevent triggering events” (interviews n°4). The Secretary-General 
reports of the Security Council of the United Nations confirmed and emphasized the fact that 




communities in northern Kosovo” (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). While UNMIK is 
facilitating interaction between the different communities, they also bring support to the 
communities to “fill the gap between minorities and communities through new structures and 
committees”. They are promoting the community’s rights and ensure fair representation. Where 
UNMIK built the foundations, progress has been made, but there is still room for improvement 
(interview n°5). It is not only about guaranteeing the security of the minorities: for instance, 
EULEX has managed to “provide technical help to the Kosovo authorities at the judiciary 
level”. The Justice Integration Agreement is a cornerstone of the process and ensures equal 
access to justice, especially to minorities (interview n°8). The European Union also facilitates 
the exchange of information between Kosovo and Serbia and is working towards a better 
dialogue between the two countries.  
Nowadays, “peacebuilding is not as big and important as it used to be, it is more trust-
building” (interview n°4). Trust-building is a key concept for UNMIK, and according to 
international peacebuilders, it has been a great success, to restore trust between the different 
communities. They brought political, religious leaders and civil society representatives 
together, and encouraged them to work collectively on small social projects. To be more 
concrete, the communities have recently worked on a project (a movie and discussion seminars) 
on violence against women, which has been presented and discussed across Kosovo with the 
local population (interviews n°4 & 5). These small signs of progress are presented as big 
successes by the international interveners. If they helped prevent tensions and building trust 
among locals, it did not rebuild the trust between global and local actors, as I heard during the 
interviews. Since these international initiatives are held as a success by the same people that 
initiated them, the real success-rates and goals are questionable and it is not completely certain 
if they are implemented to serve internationals or the locals. One thing is for sure, it did not 
improve the relations between global and local actors, tensions are still palpable.  
Something striking when I was in Pristina, is the omnipresence of the United States of America. 
Bill Clinton is held as a hero, not only a statue and a gigantic picture of him welcome anyone 
entering the city of Pristina, but the main boulevard of the city was named after him. The list 
can be long, George W. Bush Street, American Hospital, American School, USAid NGO, etc. 
During an informal conversation with a diplomat in Pristina, she confirmed that “The presence 




The diplomat added that the population can be blinded by this admiration and trust, and the 
American diplomats can use that to emphasize the success of their missions. The European 
Union was, before 2008, also an object of fascination for the locals, but its popularity did not 
last as we have seen above.   
The international interveners did succeed in stopping the conflict in 1999, however, they 
prolonged their missions over the years, with the reason that they were “only here to protect 
and help the society” (interview n°4). The latter goal is highly questionable, as well as their 
success in the field. We can wonder at what costs they displayed their “success”. They also 
claimed that thanks to an international presence, “there is a peaceful coexistence between 
different ethnics” (interview n°4). This is without taking into account all the tensions that their 
multiple missions generated between them and the locals. The success and actions I described 
above do look good on the official reports, the reality is nevertheless quite different as I will 
address it in the next part of this section.  
The missions’ flaws 
 
The interviewees and especially the local grassroots subjects insisted on the fact that the success 
of the international interveners’ missions has some limits. While international organizations 
presented reports on successful missions, the reality in the field is that they failed on many 
levels according to the interviewees and the SG reports. Their actions generated tensions and 
resistance from the local population. Consequently, the tensions between the local and global 
actors that I exposed in the previous sections appeared, according to the interviews, as an 
important element that caused the missions’ failure. Based on the fieldwork I did in Belgrade 
and Pristina; I will present three areas where the internationals failed and did not manage to 
support the local population and therefore where they suffered the most critics. 
The first argument was that they have failed in the state-building process. Regarding 
peacebuilding, “the international community was successful in stopping the conflict”. However, 
no matter how well organized they were, their capability stopped at some point. “With time, 
success became smaller and smaller because the state-building process must come from the 
inside, not from international communities and organizations” (interview n°3). Again, it proves 
that by not letting the locals have more voice and power in the process, it not only resulted in 




in that sense as well, as he stated that “the State is like a mosaic: a non-finished work built in a 
hurry. There was no love nor dedication put in the work. The international actors wanted to 
not fail for themselves, they did not care about creating a successful state […] they are 
continuing in the wrong direction” (interview n°6). Indeed, Kosovo is still struggling to have a 
sustainable state, with stable institutions and non-corrupted political leaders. Of course, the 
internationals are not the only ones to blame, but the local grassroots subjects hold it against 
them because they did not do everything they could. I would like to make precise that even if 
international interveners deeply want to help the population and sometimes go beyond their 
duty, they are bound to the 1244 resolution and the United Nations’ mandate, they often do not 
have the power to do more. In 2008, locals had faith in the European Union and the EULEX 
mission, but in ten years of prosecution, EULEX did not solve any cases. A diplomat I met in 
Pristina justified the failure by saying that “there are no pieces of evidence, no witnesses, how 
to convict people like this? And there is a difference between “making” and “assist”, and one 
mission cannot fix it all […] It is a two years mandate, and they need to prioritize the cases” 
(interview n°8). One mission can hardly fix all the problems – and the question appears what 
local politicians, who refuse internationals to interfere, do against putting corruption to an end. 
Because EULEX has now transferred all the cases to the local prosecutors, however, the result 
is still the same. Both parties are to blame for not putting an end to the massive corruption 
happening at the highest levels of the State.  
Another important finding of this empirical study is the failure of the Western 
organizations’ bureaucratic model. Once again bureaucracy seems to have shown its limits 
according to the interviewees: “EULEX is a failure because it has been built on a bureaucratic 
model. A lot of scandals, corruption, and misuse of information. NGOs failed too; millions of 
euros were spent” (interview n°6). In Pristina and Belgrade, local grassroots subjects pointed 
out that one of the consequences of an agenda prioritizing the Western organizations’ interests 
over the local ones’ is the inevitable failure of the missions based on bureaucracy and therefore 
not in line with the local realities. Most of the important decisions are taken by state officials 
rather than by elected representatives, or in the unique context of Kosovo by locals and 
communities’ leaders. Following a bureaucratic model, with excessively long and complicated 
administrative procedures, “the international organizations are prolonging the missions, and 
prefer the status quo, which is better for them to stay than to conclude the mission, they have 




(interview n°7). According to the local participants, the international interveners lost 
themselves in a succession of missions, under a twenty-year-old mandate (1244) not compatible 
with the current situation in Kosovo. They are crawling under administrative tasks, that are not 
concretely supporting the local population. I will finish with a quote from a Serbian journalist, 
quite indicative of the failure of the bureaucrats from Brussels: “you cannot negotiate with them, 
they are coming with their own agenda, it is like talking to a wall. It is just the way the EU is 
doing things, this is not against Serbs, it is a systemic problem, non-elected diplomats that just 
want to prove something” (interview n°10). 
The last major argument that was brought up several times while I was in the field is the 
following: the international community has failed to speak with one voice. A unique goal, a 
unique opinion, and a unique foreign policy might have helped the international organizations 
to restrain the growing tensions with the locals and to limit damages and failures. During the 
interviews, the lack of a single voice within the international community was a major concern 
for the interviewees: “the European Union could have done more but did not have a unique 
foreign policy. No single voice opinion, not speaking with one voice, which makes it not a strong 
player. Five EU countries still do not recognize Kosovo as an independent country” (interview 
n°3). On top of that, no new resolution was voted for in 2008 at the United Nations, despite 
extensive negotiations: “multiple actors refused any new resolution proposed, and not only 
Russia” (interview n°4) which demonstrate the inability of the international community to come 
to a common agreement. Over the years they also were not able to always cooperate. An 
international peacebuilder commented on that and admitted that “the cooperation with other 
international organizations is sometimes difficult, there is competition” (interview n°5). The 
diplomatic rivalry between the US and the EU is undeniable and it seems as if both parties want 
to claim successes for themselves, impairing cooperation between them (interview n°10). The 
locals are also aware of this problem: “There are a lot of players on the table. Different 
programs are working on improving democracy, local and global actors are involved and there 
are frictions. It is a challenge to coordinate the activities, everyone wants to do their job” 
(interview n°7). When I interviewed a diplomat in Pristina, she also pointed out the difficulty 
to “work with different mentalities, within EULEX or with the Kosovo authorities. The huge 
turnover of staff is not really helping, people are staying for just one year” (interview n°8). A 
Serbian journalist reported a striking example of the diverse opinions within the international 




including the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, were on an official visit 
to Belgrade. And to the surprise of the journalists, each of them had a different version and 
opinion on the topic discussed. The European Union especially, but the international 
community in general, failed to show the public a unique position, instead they wasted precious 
time fighting against each other, where they could have focused on the local population’s needs 
(interview n°10). As international peacebuilders argued, it is hard to cooperate with so many 
different actors, the staff turnover does not help either, and negotiations at the highest level 
(New York, Brussels) are often almost impossible (interviews n°5 & 8). 
If the internationals would have had included the local particularities and interests in the 
process to a larger extent, the results might have been different. However, the data I gathered 
not only confirmed that the missions generated tensions between local and global actors, but 
also have negative consequences and effects on the society they intervened in. The revealing 
quote of an employee of a local NGO gives an insight on the state of mind in Kosovo regarding 
the international interveners’ failures: “We are becoming the European Palestine, the conflict 
will never be solved, it is and will be a frozen country” (interview n°3).  
Accountability of international organizations 
 
The accountability and responsibility of international organizations became a central question 
during the whole process. Although not initially the focus of the study, the topic of 
accountability as being a vital one, became obvious while gathering the empirical data, making 
it necessary to include. The input from the interviewees in Pristina and Belgrade raised some 
questions regarding the accountability of international organizations in case of mistakes or 
mismanagement. In the light of the case in Kosovo, where millions of dollars were spent and 
missions extended while tensions with local authorities increased, protests became violent and 
corruption spread, these questions are getting increasingly pressing. The study at hand does not 
offer the right framework to dive deeper into answering these questions, however, it offers a 
starting point for discussion, which will conclude the section of empirical findings in the 
following.  
 First of all, I heard a critic regarding the international organizations using their success 
in 1999 as a protection and a pretext for their actions: “the NATO bombing in 1999 made them 




whenever the communities were feeling oppressed by international presence. Which led to 
people not saying anything against them” (interview n°6). International interveners protect 
themselves against any public accusation and therefore they do not have to engage their 
responsibility regarding mismanagement of the missions and failures. However, after 2010, a 
new political group emerged, Vetëvendosje, and “did not care about what the international 
community was doing or thinking” (interview n°6). Even if this party had gained power and 
weighted in the balance at the highest levels of the State, old habits are still well settled in, as 
the local government has been approving everything the international actors did for twenty 
years, in order to stay in power. Indeed, a young employee of a local NGO, confirmed that the 
“local politicians did not stand to the international community” (interview n°7).  
The international organizations not only managed to protect themselves against any 
accountability and responsibility but also made sure that the political elite, who might be able 
to hold the internationals responsible for their mistakes, was not in a position to do so. 
Unfortunately for the local grassroots subjects, this situation also serves the political elite. In 
Pristina, it seems as if the authorities think they can do anything because they have the United 
States or the United Nations’ backup, which deserve completely the population (interview n°9). 
In an interview with a Serbian researcher, he gave a prominent example of when the 
international community was not accountable for its actions. He argued that: “there were 
several instances in which EULEX and KFOR (EU and UN missions in Kosovo and Metohija) 
failed in their duties to keep peace and prevent violence and can be held accountable to have 
breached their UN peacekeeping mandate”. The incident he mentioned was the civil protests 
of 27th September 2011 in the place of Jarinje, Northern Kosovo and Metohija, an event I lined 
out in the first section of the empirical findings (interview n°11). None of the international 
actors involved in the violence against Serbs that day were held accountable, as they are 
protected by the principle of immunity. An employee from a local NGO also denounced that 
“the European Union has no responsibilities whatsoever and had a few corruption scandals”. 
In 2014 a major corruption scandal involving EULEX judges was published in the media across 
Europe. One Italian judge was prosecuted, EULEX lifted his immunity (interview n°8), 
however, he was cleared by the court in 2016. Other judges quit at that time, following the 
corruption allegations. Therefore, it can be assumed that the public image of EULEX and its 
justice mission in Kosovo is already impaired. Briefly, about the principle of immunity, it is 




the organization’s officials to exercise their functions. For instance, in the last UNMIK report 
(SG report UNMIK S/2019/797) the Secretary-General reported incidents where the 
“applicable immunities of the staff from arrest and detention and from legal process were not 
observed”, as “he [ the international staff member arrested and injured] was declared “persona 
non grata” by Kosovo authorities, a doctrine that is not applicable to, or in respect of, United 
Nations personnel” and therefore “urge the Kosovo authorities to ensure respect for the 
privileges and immunities of United Nations staff”. It is therefore impossible to legally 
prosecute or charge the international actors for their actions. It has been widely criticized and 
can be seen as a waiver of responsibility, especially in the case of Kosovo. I am not going to 
make a list of what the international community allegedly should be held accountable for, nor 
enter the debate of whether the principle of immunity is indeed necessary for the fulfillment of 
the organization’s purposes, because both arguments are valid and sound. The different 
opinions are balanced depending on which side the interviewees were and reveal a clear breach 
in the system. With more accountability, the local population would have a real lever to 
potentially make the international interveners or more broadly the international organization 
itself to be held accountable. The locals are in the front line, they need concrete actions and 
results. The international interveners benefit from special rights in the territory and the locals 
do not have anything to be able to balance the power.  
In this last thematic section, the results of the data collected showed that the international 
community may have known some real successes in its missions. However, failures cannot be 
ignored, nor the consequences of their actions and the lack of accountability of the international 
actors the interviewees denounced. The interviews and the data gathered were useful to have 
insights on the different issues cited above. I have listened to different voices, let them share 
personal experiences and opinions, which allowed me to answer the research questions. The 
process of conducting interviews revealed many details and different facets of the problem. I 







Discussion of the empirical findings 
 
In this empirical reflection section, I will discuss the results from my field research in Kosovo 
and Serbia and the indications they give us on the situation. The results of my research are based 
on the personal opinions and experiences of diverse individuals with different backgrounds and 
nationalities. They are helpful to understand the tensions that emerged from the peacebuilding 
process in Kosovo and the complex relations between local and global actors. I will also 
compare the results to other cases, based on the literature. 
The tensions understood and described by the interviewees  
 
Regarding the tensions between international interveners and the local actors in the post-
conflict situation in Kosovo, the empirical findings lead to an understanding of the kinds of 
tensions that occurred in the region since 1999. The results confirmed their existence, both local 
and global players acknowledge those tensions.  
The interviewees shared their views on the UNMIK and EULEX missions, which have 
generated frustration among the local grassroots subjects. The locals apparently had high 
expectations, I could sense that it was a general frustration in Kosovo, not only regarding the 
mission itself and its failure to prosecute the corrupted elite, as the population wanted but 
towards other issues such as the inability to travel without a visa. They were expecting too much 
of the international organizations, to end the violence and the corruption but as a diplomat in 
Pristina told me: “one mission cannot fix it all” (interview n°8). The protests against the EULEX 
mission were violent and engendered long-lasting tensions, that should not be ignored, nor the 
voices they were coming from.  
Discussion on the interviewees’ perceptions of the tensions’ causes 
 
Moreover, the interviewees mentioned potential cause of these tensions, they see the agendas 
of the Western organizations as a source of the tensions, they claim that the international 
community is setting up their agendas with their interests first, without taking into account the 
population’s interests and needs. Similar results can be found in the research on the 
peacebuilding process in Somalia by De Coning (2013). He has been confronted with the 




but diverse international community with important resources which is in reality a 
concentration of the strategic political, security, and economic needs and interests of each 
outside nation and organization is engaged in Somalia.  
Some locals also denounced the ignorance of the international community regarding 
culture and traditions, which can lead to local resistance. The results give indications not only 
on the lack of knowledge of the international interveners but on the liberal peace crisis. Indeed, 
the Western organizations are built according to a liberal model, with Western values and with 
a system based on bureaucracy. The strategy they used in Kosovo to stop the conflict, 
administrate the territory, and create institutions has not been originally designed for the unique 
context in Kosovo, but rather applied generally across the world in war-torn and post-conflict 
societies. The local interviewees were aware of it and criticized it as well as the bureaucratic 
model. Besides extensive and long procedures, the administrative burdens and the non-election 
of the diplomats seem to be a problematic issue. As the locals said in the interviews, they are 
not all dedicated to their work and the well-being of the population they are supposedly helping. 
I deduced from the different testimonies that the problem is more coming from the individuals, 
diplomats, peacebuilders, and soldiers that want the success for themselves, they want to present 
a good report to their hierarchy, putting internationals’ interests first. The indications from the 
empirical material showed the limits of the top-down approach, I will come back to this point 
in the theoretical implications section. However, I also looked at the problem from another 
perspective. The global players are, for some of them, trying to do their job with a certain 
idealism that is often required when working for the United Nations but are bound to a limited 
mandate, with a limited field of action.  
Therefore, by hearing different people’s opinions on the potential causes and implications 
of the tensions, I noticed a confusion of the roles, from the local and global actors. Indeed, the 
local interviewees insisted on their lack of sovereignty which engendered a lack of international 
status, while they are also criticizing EULEX and its failure to stop corruption, arguments that 
are also found in the literature (Mahr, 2018). The population seems to put all the blame on the 
European Union, who did not succeed in prosecuting the corrupted political elite of Kosovo. In 
the literature, scholars argue that EULEX’s legitimacy has been undermined by allegations of 
corruption among its staff as well as criticism over its reluctance to prosecute political elites 




However, two years ago EULEX transferred all cases to the authorities in Pristina, and the local 
judges did not do a better job. This is a paradox, on one hand, the local grassroots subjects are 
demanding the international community to put an end to the massive corruption as well as to 
ensure their security and on the other hand, they do not want them to interfere in Kosovo’s 
internal affairs. It is confusing, the international interviewees are claiming their goals, support, 
and good behavior towards the local population, they clearly state that they are here to assist 
and help the population to build a sustainable society. At the same time, the locals describe the 
international intervention as very intrusive, without any local involvement. The reality seems 
to be halfway between “assistance” and “complete intrusion”, both arguments are not 
inaccurate, however, they are questionable.  
Another concerning issue is the mandate of the United Nations, which is coming from the 
1244 resolution voted by the Security Council in 1999. The mandate did not evolve over the 
years, it seems as if this happened not because of lack of consideration and will of the 
international interveners, but more because of a lack of unanimity and unity at the highest level 
of the liberal organization. It resulted in a constant international presence, through a mandate 
that will not end yet. The mandate does not follow new dilemmas, both local and global actors 
are bewildered. Therefore, international interveners still operating in the field do not have the 
appropriate tools and levers to face contemporary issues. They had transferred the powers to 
the authorities in Pristina and 90% of the staff left already 12 years ago. They are trying to 
continue a mission through communities’ projects and advisory committees; however, the goals 
are becoming more and more shallow and unclear. The population noticed it and is, raising 
concerns about it. No end date to the mandate was settled in the first place. Twenty years later 
there are too many disparities and the international community does not agree on the Kosovo 
case anymore, the international interveners will not leave in the foreseeable future, which is not 
only an issue for the local actors but for the global actors as well. The ones working in the field, 
for some of them for more than twenty years, are not the ones deciding the future of the mission. 
All decisions are taken in New York City or Brussels, often not quite in sync with reality. The 
international community is lacking a single voice regarding international affairs. Twelve years 
ago, they could not agree on the future of the mission, and still cannot today. Each country and 
diplomat have a different opinion, and this applies to both the European Union and the United 




international interveners to implement effective measures, in accordance with the reality in the 
field.  
Without a single voice and unanimity, it is also challenging for the international 
interveners and diplomats to respect the important United Nations’ principle of “status neutral”. 
Based on the several interviews I conducted, the results showed that both Serbs and Albanian 
interviewees are accusing the United Nations and the European Union of a clear breach of their 
mandate. According to them, the neutrality principle is not respected, the arguments are either 
that the international community is focusing too much on the minorities, or either they are 
supporting the Kosovo-Albanians’ declaration of independence and all decisions made by 
Kosovo’s authorities since then. This is a sensitive issue, internationals are operating on thin 
ice, and we can wonder if it is a realistic principle in such a diverse and unique environment. 
On the other hand, it is a necessary principle for international organizations, for their credibility 
among the different communities. The perception of the international organizations by Serbs 
and Albanians changed over the decades, in 2008 international interveners saw a shift, as the 
Albanian community that used to endorse and support the United Nations’ work and protection 
was now rejecting its presence. As for the Serb community, they used to see international 
organizations and forces as invaders, however, since 2008 they are counting on them for the 
protection of their human rights and their safety. We can see here why the international presence 
is still important and necessary for the local population.  
Discussion on the potential consequences of the missions 
 
Regarding the successes and failures mentioned during the interviews, the results can be 
discussed. While the local interviewees mostly blamed the international community for the 
state-building failure and their inability to listen to the local players, they tended to forget the 
role of the local political elite, to which the powers have been transferred gradually since 2000. 
We also must consider the limited resources of the international interveners, both regarding the 
law and the means. Besides, the global players faced local resistance, which made the 
implementation of measures and projects harder. I am not discussing whether the local 
resistance was justified, but it was part of the tensions. Some argued in the interviews that the 
state-building must come from the inside, and that “one mission cannot fix it all” (interview 




population. This goal has not been achieved yet, even if UNMIK is nowadays mainly working 
on trust-building among the different communities, which is also very important to bring all 
actors together. However, there is a cruel lack of trust between local and global players. Without 
trust and cooperation, as well as transparency from the local government and the international 
organizations, the missions will be doomed to fail in the field. Regarding the security and the 
end of the violent conflict, the global players undeniably succeed, the local population is safer. 
This was also confirmed in a recent study on the EULEX mission, which successfully achieved 
its overall politico-strategic goals to contribute to the prevention of further violent conflict 
(Zupančič et al. 2018). Still today UNMIK as well as EULEX and KFOR are working to ensure 
the safety of minorities. However, the violence did not disappear, every year numerous attacks 
are reported against the Serb or Albanian community, along with violence between local and 
global actors.                                                                           
It seems that the international diplomats will always find a way to make the mission look 
successful on paper, to ensure their personal success, and the local political elite protecting its 
position and wealth, leaving the local population on the sidelines. These potential failures and 
successes are very subjective, depending on which side we are looking at it.   
The last reflection is on the accountability of international organizations. According to 
the results of the empirical study, local grassroots subjects seem to be concerned by the 
responsibility of the international interveners and the institutions they are working for. They 
benefit from numerous immunities, granted to them on the ground of the necessity to achieve 
the purposes of the mission. Those immunities can be lifted by the institutions in extreme cases, 
such as for the prosecution of a supposedly corrupted judge. As mentioned in the empirical 
findings section, the local interviewees are asking for the international interveners to be held 
accountable. The results, with the critics of the present regime of immunities, can be applied 
more generally, as there are several examples where the United Nations was not held 
accountable for its actions and mistakes. While the arguments in favor of the immunities’ 
regime are understandable, for the continuity and the purposes of the missions, for the 
protection of the international interveners, the counter-arguments are hearable as well. 
Especially when innocent locals physically, mentally, and economically suffered from global 
actors’ actions. It seems that the shift in the immunities regime of the United Nations is not the 




internationals’ decisions to stay in power. It seems that the local elite exploits the legitimacy of 
liberal institutions to advance their political interests or deny the pursuit of justice for the sake 
of short-term stability. In the same way, it happened in Cambodia and Timor-Leste when the 
decisions of the local elite failed to reflect the local aspirations for justice and reconciliation 
(Simangan 2017). In addition to that, when reflecting on the responsibility of the international 
interveners, we can wonder about the responsibility of the corrupted political elite at the local 
level. Not one of them was convicted. There is massive impunity, at the global level but also 
the local level. The population is the first to directly suffer from this lack of responsibility, they 
can claim reparation for the harm caused by the international interveners, however, it is most 
likely going to be denied by the United Nations. The last point will be further discussed in the 






In the first part of the conclusion, I will present an answer to my research question, based on 
the data collected during the field study and the interview of grassroots subjects. The question 
stated in the introduction is the following: How the interplay between local and global actors 
has been marked by tensions and what are the consequences of these tensions on the peace 
building and state building in Kosovo?  
Through the interviews and the official documents, that both entailed violent events and 
altercations between local and global actors, as well as the frustration of the local grassroots 
subjects towards the international community, I could get indications on the potential causes of 
the tensions and perspectives on the consequences of those tensions. The interviewees shared 
their frustration, personal feelings, expectations, and delusions, I did not interact with the 
political elite, as I was looking for the opinions of the local grassroots subjects, who are on the 
front line of those tensions with the international community. I also interviewed international 
peacebuilders and diplomats, in order to get the full picture. The interesting personal 
experiences and opinions from diverse people were invaluable testimonies that helped me to 
understand how the interplay between local and global actors has been tainted by tensions. I 
noticed the same patterns, as the critics and experiences were often similar, and I understand it 
does not represent the opinion of the whole population of Kosovo and Serbia. However, it has 
given useful and relevant insights on how the participants understood those tensions and their 
consequences on the development of Kosovo and the life of the local population. The latter has 
been left out during this peacebuilding process, the agendas of the Western organizations were 
not established following the local interests, culture, and traditions. The lack of sovereignty and 
status of the locals as well as the lack of effectiveness of the missions engendered violent 
episodes over the years, and those tensions are still palpable today. As I also found out in the 
literature, top-down approaches do not only leave a small space to include the locals in the 
peacebuilding process but also demonstrate the limits of the liberal peace (Van Leeuwena et 
al., 2015; Williams & Mengistu, 2015; Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013). Indeed, the liberal values 
are sometimes hard to implement in a post-conflict society, where the institutions are either 
non-existent or unstable.  
The international organizations are aware of the local realities – as seen in the SG reports 




Security Council reports. Therefore, locals displayed their discontentment and disappointment, 
which did not lead to major improvements nor changes. Thanks to the interviews and my 
research trip to Pristina and Belgrade, I could get some perspective regarding the consequences 
on the everyday peace and everyday life of the local population, as well as the consequences 
for the international interveners still operating in the field. There are confusion and uncertainty, 
the peacebuilding mission of the United Nations will be still active, and the local government 
in Kosovo is more unstable than ever at the time this study is being conducted. The people in 
Kosovo cannot travel without a visa, the country is, twelve years after the declaration of 
independence, still not recognized by enough countries in order to integrate international 
programs and institutions that could increase the economic and diplomatic development of 
Kosovo. In Serbia, people seem to be strongly opposed to letting go of the southern part of the 
country, which makes the task almost impossible for the Kosovo authorities. The inhabitants 
and the government are struggling with poor economic growth, the communication between 
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians is still very fragile on every level.  
Nevertheless, the blame cannot be put on the international community only, as the 
international interveners faced local resistance, hostile reactions, and arrived in a devastated 
territory. They are human beings, with limited resources, and landing in Kosovo in 1999 has 
been a shock for some of them, something they were not prepared for (interview n°4). They 
have done an outstanding job in putting an end to the violent conflict, in such a unique context, 
with so many different actors involved. While the actions and decisions of the international 
community in the following years are questionable, we cannot ignore the mitigating 
circumstances and factors. The directives and goals were set by diplomats and officials 
thousand miles away from the region. Their employees working in the field had to work towards 
those goals while discovering a completely different reality. This created great confusion for 
the interveners. During an informal discussion with a diplomat in Pristina, she remembered how 
the UNMIK staff had to carry and distribute bags of Deutsche Mark to every village, in order 
to get money in circulation, as there was none after the war in 1999. An international 
peacebuilder also shared his idealist ideas and philosophy, essential according to him to work 
for the United Nations. Both parties, local and global actors participated in the spread of 
tensions and violence. It resulted in serious consequences at the economic, diplomatic, and 
social levels. It is not the only reason for the slow development of Kosovo, as the well-known 




process more complicated. Mistakes were made, the approaches were apparently not the right 
ones, and innocent people and entire communities are still suffering from it today. Overall, this 
is a very complex and sensitive issue, with multiple factors and actors, and I only addressed the 
tip of the iceberg. Nevertheless, a good starting point for further research has been made. 
Theoretical implications 
 
The previous research brings some perspectives on the indications I got from the empirical data 
and are quite important regarding the field of study. The tensions studied are also mentioned in 
the literature, where scholars often use the term “friction”. This term was introduced by 
Björkdahl & Höglund (2013), as they argued that the international interveners left limited space 
for local actors to construct a peace of their own, which led to tensions between local and global 
actors. When considering the “frictions” between local and global actors, however, they mostly 
interviewed political actors and heads of NGOs, which is different from their study, as I chose 
to interview grassroots subjects at the local level, and international peacebuilders that were in 
Kosovo since 1999. This choice was based on the differentiation in Lederach’s peacebuilding 
pyramid (Lederach, 1997), and the main focus of this study is on the grassroots level, with 
actors involved in local communities and members of indigenous NGOs. They do not 
necessarily have the means to integrate higher levels of organization or action, however, they 
have a key role to place in conflict resolution. Indeed, they are at the bottom of the pyramid 
(and the society), they are dealing with the manifestations and consequences of the conflict on 
an everyday basis. While the results of this study showed a gap between local and global actors 
in the peacebuilding process, scholars have also highlighted this gap. Indeed, Aggestam and 
Strömbom (2013) argued that as local NGOs have been excluded from the peace negotiations, 
they lost influence and credibility, and therefore it increases the gap. Additionally, their findings 
support the results from this study, that different visions and expectations of peace can arise 
tensions, frustration, and contestations. 
Regarding more specifically the limitations of EU policies in post-conflict Kosovo, Mahr 
(2018) indicated that the population first supported the mission, but despite this endorsement at 
the highest political levels, resistance and protests emerged right after the mission started, and 
by both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. It gives some empirical indications on the 




sovereignty of the locals, and similar arguments can be found in my empirical findings and 
reflection. 
Following on the potential causes of the tensions, scholars argued that international 
peacebuilders need to rethink their language, goals, and approach as Wallis (2017) stated, they 
need to be in adequacy with the local population. In her article, the researcher also warns on the 
pitfalls of the local turn, with the emerging evidence from Timor-Leste where the state 
transferred the responsibility for public goods provision to the local level in order to lessen the 
burden on the state and to divert attention from ineffective or illegitimate central institutions 
(Wallis, 2017). This is relevant to the study, as it questions the legitimacy of the local 
institutions. While the legitimacy of international organizations has been a serious concern for 
the locals but among scholars, we cannot omit the legitimacy of the local institutions (Hirblinger 
& Simons, 2015). It has led to a reflection on the local ownership concept, which implies the 
participation and inclusion of the local (civil society and politicians) in the peacebuilding and 
state-building process, in order to implement appropriate, coherent, and sustainable measures 
in the region internationals’ are intervening in (Nathan, 2007; Narten, 2008). In the Kosovo 
case, long-lasting missions are therefore causing problems of legitimacy and local ownership 
to the Kosovo population, even if UNMIK already started the transfer of competences in 2000, 
it is a very long process. On the other hand, there are pitfalls and risks to local ownership, some 
local players can take advantage of such a situation, in Pristina the United Nations still has a 
privileged position and the local political elite has been exploiting the legitimacy of liberal 
institutions for their own political interests (Simangan, 2017). 
The results of the empirical findings section showed signs that the agendas of the Western 
organizations are not compatible with the local principles, nor their culture and traditions. The 
same argument can be found in Sung Yong Lee’s article, the international interveners can face 
principle-oriented local resistance where people resist peacebuilding because they believe the 
themes set by international actors are based on the interests of the international community first, 
for who consulting the locals was not an option (Sung Yong Lee, 2015). Scholars witnessed 
other potential causes of the tensions, which is interesting as it is in the continuity of my own 
results. The status neutral of the United Nations can also be a source of disagreement not only 
between local and global actors but among the different communities, as the subjects I 




been reinterpreted as “impartial support” for peace or reconstruction processes, but in intense 
conflict zones, no intervener will be seen as impartial (chapter 8; 2011), a claim that has been 
confirmed during the different interviews. 
Finally, there are decisive points lined out in the reviewed literature on different issues 
that can be seen as consequences of the tensions that emerged from the interplay between local 
and global interveners during peacebuilding operations. Here again, similar claims and results 
can be found in my field study. First, critics have called for moderated and alternative policy 
models rather than following the liberal peace strategies, including imposed agenda, based on 
Western values and interests. And since liberal peace is essentially a preconceived set of 
strategies, it leaves little room for negotiation with local actors. The top-down approach and 
massive interventionism have been the main critics of the liberal peace, quite rightly regarding 
the outcomes of the different missions in the field (Van Leeuwena et al., 2015; Björkdahl & 
Höglund, 2013; William & Mengistu, 2015). Regarding accountability, which was an important 
issue brought up several times during the interviews, previous studies have shown an interest 
in this issue, and help us understand all the consequences it has on the individuals. Authors 
wrote that there is a need for change in the regime of accountability of the international 
organizations and their employees, an argument raised by some of the people I interviewed. In 
the literature, scholars suggested solutions that must be found in order for the United Nations 
to be able to pay reparations to the individuals to whom they caused harm. The functional 
immunities established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 do not seem fair anymore, 
considering the nature and the scope of the peacebuilding missions, with all the individuals and 
different players they involve (Boon, 2016; Wilde, 2006; Boon & Mégret, 2019). Previous 
research is useful to understand the tensions, their potential causes, and their consequences. 
While the methods of data collection are different from the ones I used, scholars however had 
similar findings and arguments in their articles and books. 
With hindsight on my field study, and based on the empirical and literature reflections, I 
have some indications for future research. First, local’s opinions should be more represented in 
the literature, but to fully overcome this gap it would be interesting to combine both points of 
view in one research, the grassroots subjects’, and the officials’ ones (local elite). Moreover, I 
heard accusations, frustration, and discontent regarding the corruption in the region, but I did 




international level would be enlightening to understand the damages it has on the state building 
in Kosovo. It appears that the locals do not want the international community to interfere in 
internal affairs, but it is unclear if they can govern and administrate the country on their own in 
a sustainable way. It would also be relevant, in a larger study, to compare the tensions that arose 
during peacebuilding processes across the world. A multiple case study, with testimonies from 
the local grassroots subjects, the local political elite, the international interveners in the field as 
well as global actors at the highest level of the international institutions would help to 
understand how and why the interplay of those players are leading to tensions, which has an 
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Appendix 2: Article 105 - Charter of the United Nations 
 
Chapter XVI — Miscellaneous Provisions 
Articles 104 and 105 
 
Article 104: 
“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for 
the exercise of its funcions and the fulfillment of its purposes.” 
Article 105: 
“1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. 
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization. 
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this 
purpose.” 




















1: Informal conversation with a Serbian couple living in France - 11/01/2020 - Lyon 
2: Informal conversation with a Serbian Ex-journalist - 15/01/2020 - Lyon 
3: Semi-structured interview with an employee from a local NGO - 28/01/2020 - Pristina 
4: Semi-structured interview with an international Peacebuilder - 29 & 30/01/2020 - Pristina 
5: Semi-structured interview with an international Peacebuilder - 3/02/2020 - Pristina 
6: Semi-structured interview with the editor in chief of a local journal - 4/02/2020 - Pristina 
7: Semi-structured interview with two young local employees of an NGO - 4/02/2020 - Pristina 
8: Semi-structured interview with an international organization employee -5/02/2020- Pristina 
9: Informal conversation with a Diplomat from a Western European country - 5/02 – Pristina 
10: Semi-structured interview with a local journalist - 8/02/2020 - Belgrade  
11: Interview via email with a Serbian researcher - 21/02/2020 - Belgrade 




13: SG report UNMIK S/2004/348 (p2 II.4.5.6) 
14: SG report UNMIK S/2008/354 (p3 III.10) 
15: SG report UNMIK S/2009/497 (p3 IV.11; p6 VII.27; p10 XII.47) 








Interview guide for semi-structured interviews 
 




- The Kosovo War in 1998/99 
- Intervention of the UN, the UNMIK mission, the bombing of Belgrade 
- 2004 riots in Kosovo, ethnic violence against Serbs 
- Meeting with UN or EU officials 
- Traumatic experiences 
 
2) Present – Recent events 
 
- Since 2008 and the independence of Kosovo, what really changed? Flag, nationality, 
institutions, feeling to belong to a nation. 
- The EULEX mission, EU administration: impacts on everyday life and peace, on the 
peacebuilding process, on the development of Kosovar institutions, rule of law and EU trials. 
- Everyday peace, position of the locals in the peacebuilding – peacekeeping process 
(institutions, politics...) 




- Are your interests considered? 
- Respect of your culture and tradition by the third parties and international interveners (EU, 
UN) 
- Link between the past and the present: evolution, changes, peacekeeping 
 
 
Table for interview with locals (Serb or Albanian) 
 




   
How did you lived the 
intervention of 3rd 
parties – tension, 
frustration 
   
The respect of your 
culture 
   
Are your interests taken 
into account? 







Table for interview with officials (NGO, EU, UN) + for research on historical documents 
 
 1998 - 2008 2008 PRESENT 
Peacebuilding goals, 
intentions, aims 
   
Interactions with the 
locals 
   
Interests in the conflict, 
in the peacebuilding 
process or land 
   
Protection of who? 
Locals, political elite, 
western interests... 
   
 
 
 
 
